volume	12,	no.	17 november	2012 Medieval Approaches to Consciousness: Ockham and Chatton Susan Brower-Toland Saint Louis University © 2012 Susan	Brower-Toland This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License. <www.philosophersimprint.org/012017/> T	aking	their	cue	from	Augustine's	account	of	self-knowledge in the latter	books	of	De Trinitate,	medieval	philosophers	hold	that	knowledge	regarding	our	own	mental	states	is	epistemically distinctive	in	a	number	of	ways.	It	is	widely	assumed,	for	example,	that we	are	immediately	aware	of	a	wide	range	of	such	states	and	that	the nature	of	our	access	to	them	yields	knowledge	that	not	only	is	utterly certain	but	also	involves	a	kind	of	first-person	authority	(which	is	just to	say	that	no	one	is	better	positioned	to	ascertain	our	mental	states than	we	ourselves	are).	For	the	same	reason,	it	is	also	assumed,	on	this medieval	Augustinian	picture,	that	the	judgments	or	beliefs	constitutive	of	self-knowledge	-	call	them	"self-attributing"	beliefs	-	are	characterized	by	(a)	immediacy,	(b)	certainty,	and	(c)	first-person	authority. Yet,	even	if	medieval	thinkers	generally	agree	about	the	basic	character	of self-knowledge, they	disagree about	what is required to explain	our	possession	of	it.	They	disagree,	in	other	words,	over	how	to explain	the	nature	of	our access	to	our	subjective	states.	As	I	see	it,	their disagreement	on this issue is, at	bottom,	a	debate	about the	nature and	structure	of	conscious	experience.1	In	this	paper,	my	aim	is	to	advance	our	understanding	of	medieval	approaches	to	consciousness	by focusing	on	a	particular	but,	as	it	seems	to	me,	representative	medieval debate	-	one	which	has,	as its locus,	a	particular	concern	about	selfknowledge.	The	debate in	question is	between	William	Ockham	(d. 1349)	and	Walter	Chatton	(d.	1343)	over	the	existence	of	what	these two	thinkers	refer	to	as	"reflexive	intellective	intuitive	cognition".2	Although	framed	in	the	technical	terminology	of	late-medieval	cognitive psychology,	the	basic	question	at	issue	between	them	is	this:	Does	the mind (or "intellect") cognize its own states via higher-order (or "reflexive")	representational	states	(namely,	acts	of	"intuitive	cognition")? 1. Although	I	am	not	the	first	to	suggest	that	there	is	a	connection	between	medieval	discussions	of	self-knowledge	and	theories	of	consciousness	(see,	for example,	Yrjönsuuri	2007;	Rode	2008,	2010;	and	Toivanen	2009), the suggestion	itself	has	yet	to	receive	any	systematic	development	or	defense. 2. Earlier	treatments	of	the	debate	between	Ockham	and	Chatton	can	be	found in	Yrjönsuuri	2007,	Michon	2007	and	Putallaz	2005.	Although	there	are	differences	in	the	details	of	our	analyses,	Yrjönsuuri	sees	the	debate	much	as	I do	-	namely,	as	fundamentally	about	the	proper	analysis	of	consciousness. ImprintPhilosophers' susan	brower-toland Medieval Approaches to Consciousness: Ockham and Chatton philosophers'	imprint – 2 – vol.	12,	no.	17	(november	2012) I claim that, for	Ockham, consciousness turns	out to	be	a	matter	of higher-order	representation,	whereas	for	Chatton	it	is	neither	higherorder,	nor	representational,	nor	-	in	any	straightforward	sense	of	the term	-	even intentional in	nature.	As	will	become	clear, this	part	of the	paper	is	designed	not	only	to	call	attention	to	the	kinds	of	theories on	offer	in	medieval	debates	about	consciousness	but	also	to	indicate just	how	closely these	debates	come	to	contemporary treatments	of the same issues. Because	medieval thinkers anticipate a number of the	theories	on	offer	in	more	recent	discussions	of	consciousness	and, in	some	cases,	are	motivated	by	dialectical	considerations	similar to those at	work in current	debates, the comparison, I believe, proves both	useful	and	illuminating. 1. Self-Knowledge and Reflexive Intellective Intuition: Ockham's Account The disagreement between Ockham and Chatton is centered on Ockham's contention that the	mind	-	or intellect	-	can reflexively, intuitively	cognize	its	own	states.	In	order	to	understand	the	significance of this disagreement, however, a bit of background on	Ockham's	theory	of	intuitive	cognition	is	in	order.5 1.1 Background: Ockham on Intuitive Cognition Like many medieval philosophers, Ockham divides psychological states	into	those	that	are	conative	(or	associated	with	appetitive	or	motive	powers)	and	those	that	are	cognitive	(or associated	with	the	sensory	or	rational	powers	by	which	we	acquire	and	process	information).6 5. In	what follows, citations	of	Ockham's	Latin texts	are to	Ockham	1967–88. My	discussion	draws	solely	on	works	in	his	Opera Theologica	(=OTh).	I	use	the following	abbreviations	in	referring	to	particular	volumes: Ord. (= Ordinatio. Scriptum in Librum Primum Sententiarum);	Rep.	(=	Reportatio);	Quodl.	(=	Quodlibeta Septem).	All	references	to	Chatton	are	to	Chatton	1989.	Unless	otherwise noted,	translations	are	my	own. 6. Though	Ockham	distinguishes between acts of	willing and intellect along these	sorts	of lines, in the	end,	he	denies	any	real	distinction	between	the faculties	of	intellect	and	will	themselves. As	we'll	see,	Ockham	answers	in	the	affirmative,	Chatton	in	the	negative,	with	each	arguing	that	his	own	position	best	accommodates	the nature	and	character	of	Augustinian	self-knowledge. I	take	the	debate	between	Ockham	and	Chatton	to	be	representative	both	because	it	illustrates	one	of	the	main	contexts	in	which	issues connected	with	consciousness	arise	in	the	later	medieval	period	and also	because	it	showcases	the	central dialectical issues and alternatives at play in medieval discussions of consciousness generally. Ockham and Chatton's debate illustrates the way in which questions	about	the nature	and	requirements	for	self-knowledge	get	connected	to	broader debates in cognitive theory.3	What is	more, the positions they stake out in the course of their debate represent what I take to be the two main	types	of	approach	to	consciousness	one	finds	in	the	later	Middle Ages	-	namely,	those	that	explain	consciousness	in	terms	of	intentionality	(typically,	higher-order intentionality)	and	those	that	understand consciousness	as	a	non-intentional,	sui generis	mode	of	awareness.4 The	discussion	to	follow	divides	into	two	main	parts.	The	first	part (which	spans	Sections	1	and	2)	introduces	the	basic	outlines	of	the	debate	between	Ockham	and	Chatton.	I	begin	with	a	brief	sketch	of	Ockham's	theory	of	intuitive	cognition	generally.	I	then	consider	Ockham's main	argument	for	introducing	higher-order,	intellective	intuition	and Chatton's	arguments	against	doing	so.	In	the	second	part	of	the	paper (primarily Section 3), I draw	out the implications of this debate for the	two	thinkers'	respective	views	about	the	nature	of	consciousness. 3. See	Putallaz	1991,	which	provides	a	very	useful	(and, to	date, the	most	extensive) historical survey of later	medieval discussions of self-knowledge. Although Putallaz's primary focus is on medieval accounts of the soul's knowledge	of	itself,	he	does	also	cover	some	of	the	debates	about	the	soul's knowledge	of	its	states.	See	also	Michon	2007. 4. As	will	become	clear, I'm	using the	notion	of intentionality	expansively to refer	generically	to	that	aspect	of	a	mental	state	or	event	that	constitutes	its being	directed at	or	about something.	Thus,	I	intend	it	to	cover	not	only	those accounts	which,	like	Ockham's,	explain	such	directedness	in	terms	of	the	representational	features	of	such	states	but	also	accounts	which	take	intentional directedness to be some kind of non-representational awareness of, or acquaintance	with,	intentional	objects. susan	brower-toland Medieval Approaches to Consciousness: Ockham and Chatton philosophers'	imprint – 3 – vol.	12,	no.	17	(november	2012) Intuitive	cognition	of	a	thing	is	cognition	such	that	by	virtue	of	it	one	can	know	whether	a	thing	exists	or	does	not exist so that, if the thing	does exist, the intellect immediately [statim] judges that it	exists	and evidently cognizes that	it	exists.	...	Likewise,	intuitive	cognition	is	such	that when [two	or	more] things	are cognized,	one	of	which inheres	in	another,	or	is	spatially	distant	from	another,	or stands	in	some	other	relation	to	another,	then,	by	virtue of	this	non-propositional	cognition,	one	immediately [statim]	knows	whether	the	one	thing	inheres	or	not,	is	distant or	not,	and	so	on	concerning	other	contingent truths.... For	instance,	if	Socrates	is	in	fact	pale,	that	awareness	of Socrates	and	his	pallor	by	virtue	of	which	we	can	evidently	cognize	that	Socrates	is	pale	is	called	intuitive.	And,	in general,	any	non-propositional	awareness	of	some	term or	thing	(or	multiple	terms	or	things)	is	an	intuitive	cognition if	we	can,	by	virtue	of it,	evidently	cognize	some contingent truth	-	especially about present matters of fact.	(Ord.	I	Prol.	q.1,	a.1	[OTh	I,	31–32]) In	this	passage,	Ockham	identifies intuitive	states	as	those	that	play a twofold role in the formation	of perceptual judgments: namely, a psychological	role	and	an	epistemic	role.	He	tells	us,	for	example,	that an	intuitive	cognition	of	an	object	is	such	that,	by	virtue	of	it,	"the	intellect	immediately	judges	that	[the	object]	exists"	and	possesses	certain attributes.	This is the	psychological role: intuition	of some	object is such that it automatically gives rise to judgments concerning its current	existence	and	contingent,	perceptible	characteristics.11	In	addition, the intuition plays a second, epistemic role vis-à-vis the judgments it	occasions.	As	the	foregoing	passage	makes	clear,	the	sorts	of	judgments that	are formed	on the	basis	of intuition	(namely, judgments 11. Thus, if I intuitively	cognize	Socrates, this intuition	will	automatically	give rise	to	a	number	of	beliefs	about	him	-	say,	beliefs	to	the	effect	that	Socrates is	right	here,	that	he	is	pale,	that	he	is	standing	to	the	left	of	me,	etc. Cognitive	states,	on	Ockham's	view,	can	be	exhaustively	divided	into two broad categories: those that are propositional in content (complexa) and those that are non-propositional (incomplexa). The latter category	he	further	subdivides	into	what	he	calls	intuitive	and	abstractive cognition.7 Broadly speaking,	we can think	of	Ockham's notion of intuitive cognition in terms	of our	own (perhaps	pre-theoretical) notion	of	perception:	it	is	a	type	of	cognition	that	provides	immediate access to the	world, yielding information about contingent, current, local	matters	of	fact	-	viz.,	how	things	stand	right	here	and	now.	For the same reason,	we	can	begin	by thinking	of	Ockham's	distinction between	intuitive	and	abstractive	cognition	as,	roughly,	a	distinction between	perceptual	and	non-perceptual	states.8 While the foregoing characterization captures the	basic intuition behind	the	intuitive/abstractive	distinction,	Ockham	prefers	to	mark it	in	terms	of	the	functional	roles	these	states	play	in	the	formation	and justification	of	certain	kinds	of	judgment.9	Thus,	on	his	view,	an	intuitive	cognition	of	some	object	is	one	that	directly	produces	and	directly justifies	beliefs	about	the	existence	and	observable	features	of	that	object.10	As	he	explains: 7. Typically,	Ockham	presents	the	distinction	between	intuitive	and	abstractive states	as	a	distinction	between two types	of	non-propositional state.	He is willing,	however,	to	allow	for	a	broad	usage	of	the	term	'abstractive'	according	to	which	it	refers	to	a	cognitive	state	that	is	not	intuitive.	For	this	broader usage,	see	his	discussion	of	intuition	and	abstraction	at	Rep.	II	12–13. 8. That	Ockham	and	his	contemporaries	think	of	intuitive	cognition	in	terms	of perception	can	be	seen	in	their	tendency	to	characterize	it	using	metaphors of	"vision"	or	"seeing".	Indeed,	for	Ockham	as	well	as	Chatton,	'intuitio'	and 'visio' are interchangeable expressions.	Although	Ockham explicitly allows that there are	non-visual	modes	of intuition, visual perception is certainly treated	as	the	paradigmatic	case	of	intuition. 9. Although	the	issue	of	intuitive	cognition	arises	in	a	variety	of	contexts	in	Ockham's	writings,	the	most	extensive	and	systematic	treatment	of it	occurs	in the	Prologue	of	his	Ordinatio	commentary	(q.1,	a.1).	It	is	here	that	he	offers	a sustained	defense	of	the	notion	of	intellective	intuition. 10.	On	Ockham's	view, intuitive cognitions themselves	are caused	only	by	objects	in	relevant	proximity	-	i. e.,	within	causal	reach	of	one's	sensory	faculties. Hence,	barring	supernatural	intervention,	intuitive	cognition	is	restricted	to entities	within	one's	immediate	environment. susan	brower-toland Medieval Approaches to Consciousness: Ockham and Chatton philosophers'	imprint – 4 – vol.	12,	no.	17	(november	2012) as	an	abstractive	cognition.	Thus,	non-perceptual	states	such	as	acts	of memory,	imagination,	and	conceptualization	are	abstractive. The	distinction	between intuitive	and	abstractive	cognition is	not original	to	Ockham	-	it	traces	directly	to	Scotus	(d.	1308)	and	has	its roots	in	even	earlier	thinkers.14	Even	so,	the	various	ways	Ockham	develops	and	applies	it	prove	both	innovative	and,	at	least	in	his	day,	controversial.	A	case	in	point	is	his	claim	that	this	distinction	holds	both	at the	level	of	sensory	cognition	and	at	the	level	of	intellective	cognition. Most medieval thinkers, Ockham included, distinguish between sensory	and intellectual cognition.	The former	consists in the	activation	and	deliverances	of	the	five	external	senses	as	well	as	the	cognitive contribution	of	the	internal	sensory	faculties.15	By	contrast,	intellective operations	-	at	least	in	Ockham's	cognitive	theory	-	include	not	only things	like	concept	formation,	propositional	attitudes,	and	discursive reasoning	but	also,	and	much	more	controversially, acts	of intuitive cognition.	While	many	of	Ockham's	contemporaries	were	willing to embrace	the	notion	of	intuitive	cognition	at	the	level	of	sensory	cognition	(indeed,	sense	cognition	appears	to	be	a	paradigmatic	form	of	perception),	there	was	a	great	deal	more	controversy	over	the	existence of	intuitive	cognition	at	the	level	of	intellect.	It's	not	altogether	clear, for example, that Scotus	-	from	whom	Ockham takes the intuitive/ abstractive	distinction	-	is	willing	to	admit	intuition	at	the	level	of	intellect	(though	Ockham,	no	doubt	to	bolster	his	own	case,	insists	that 14. Something	like	the	notion	of	intuition	is	present	in	Vital	du	Four	(d.	1327),	for example.	See	Lynch	1972.	Neither	the	early	history	of	nor	the	driving	motivations	for	the	introduction	of	the	distinction	between	intuitive	and	abstractive cognition	is	well	understood.	Useful	treatments	of	the	history	of	intuitive	cognition	include	Boler	1982,	Day	1947,	and	King	forthcoming(a). 15. There is little literature devoted to Ockham's treatment of sensory cognition	-	and	most	of	what	exists focuses	on	his rejection	of sensible	species. This lacuna	in	our	knowledge	of this	part	of	his	cognitive	theory	may	owe to the fact that	Ockham	himself treats sensation as ancillary.	Although	he concedes	the	Aristotelian	dictum	that	whatever	is	in	the	intellect	is	first	in	the senses,	he	gives	little	attention	to	the	precise	role	sensation	plays	in	cognition. For	useful	discussion	of	Ockham	on	sensation,	see	Perler	2008	and	Tachau 1988	(130ff). about	current,	contingent	matters)	are	also	such	that	they	are	directly, or	non-inferentially, justified	by	the intuition	itself.	This is indicated by	Ockham's repeated	claim that such judgments	constitute "evident knowledge"	-	or	"evident	cognition"	of	contingent	facts.12	For	Ockham, the	notion	of	evidentness	signals	a	class	of	epistemically	secure,	or	even privileged,	cognitive	states.13 Now,	by	contrast	with	intuitive	states,	abstractive	cognitions	play neither of these roles	-	they neither automatically give rise to nor provide immediate justification for judgments regarding contingent, current,	local	matters	of	fact.	Indeed,	Ockham	introduces	the	label	"abstractive"	for	any	state	that	doesn't	function	as	intuitive	states	do: Abstractive cognition, on the other hand, is that cognition	by	virtue	of	which	we	cannot	know	concerning	some contingent thing	whether it	exists	or	does	not.	...	Thus, by	means	of	an	abstractive	cognition	we	cannot	evidently cognize	any	contingent	truth	-	in	particular,	no	truth	relating	to	the	present.	This	is	clear	from	the	fact	that	when Socrates and his pallor are considered in his absence, we are not able to know by virtue of this non-propositional	mode	of	awareness	whether	Socrates	exists	or	not, whether	he	is	pale	or	not,	or	whether	or	not	he	is	spatially distant	from	a	given	place	-	and	so	on	concerning	other contingent	truths.	(Ord.	I	Prol.	q.	1,	a.1	[OTh	I,	32]) Accordingly,	any	non-propositional	state	that	does	not	ground	knowledge	of	contingent,	current	matters	of	fact	counts,	in	Ockham's	scheme, 12. Karger 1999 (208–9) provides a useful overview of Ockham's notion of evidentness. 13. What	he	means	to	highlight	in	the	foregoing	passage,	therefore,	is	that	perceptual judgments	-	that is, judgments	arising from intuitive	acts	-	qualify as evident in this technical sense.	There is a long tradition	of interpreting Ockham	as	holding	that	judgments	grounded	in	intuition	are	infallible.	See Stump	1999	for	a	recent	discussion	of	the	infallibilist	reading	and	Karger	1999 for	criticism	of	this	line	of	interpretation. susan	brower-toland Medieval Approaches to Consciousness: Ockham and Chatton philosophers'	imprint – 5 – vol.	12,	no.	17	(november	2012) enon	of	self-knowledge	provides	decisive	evidence	for	the	existence of	an	intellective,	non-sensory	mode	of	perception.	Just	how	it	does	so, I	shall	now	attempt	to	explain. 1.2 The Argument from Self-Knowledge The	argument	from	self-knowledge	takes	as	its	starting	point	the	fact that	we	possess	knowledge	regarding	a	wide	range	of	our	states.	This is obvious,	Ockham thinks, from	everyday experience: "[E]veryone experiences	in	himself	that	he	thinks,	loves,	rejoices,	and	grieves".20 Not	only	does	the	argument	assume	the	existence	of	self-knowledge, however;	it	also	presupposes	an	Augustinian	account	of	its	nature.	In fact,	Ockham	explicitly	calls	attention	to	the	hallmark	features	of	the Augustinian view: namely, the immediacy, certainty,21 and first-person	authority22	of	self-attributing	beliefs.	Following	Augustine,	moreover,	he	characterizes the immediacy	of	self-knowledge in terms	of its	non-discursive	or	non-inferential	nature.23	Indeed,	for	reasons	that 20. Ord.	Prol.	q.1,	a.1 (OTh	I,	40). 21. Indeed,	as	Ockham	himself	points	out, in	De Trinitate 15,	Augustine	argues that self-knowledge is indubitable	-	immune from any kind of skeptical doubt.	Ord.	Prol.	q.1,	a.1 (OTh	I,	43–44) 22.	Ockham offers the following as evidence of Augustine's endorsement of something like	first-person	authority: "Again, in	chapter	2 [of	De Trinitate] he [Augustine] proves, first, that faith does not pertain to some sense of the	body,	and	afterward	continues: 'this thing	belongs	to the	heart,	not to the	body,	nor	is	it	outside	of	us	but	it	is	in	the	inmost	part	in	us;	nor	does any	person	see	it	in	another,	but	each	only	in	himself'.	And	he	then	continues: 'therefore, anyone sees	his own faith in	his own self, but in another he	believes	that	it	exists,	he	does	not	see.'	From	this	it	is	clear	that	one	has some	non-propositional	grasp	of	faith	properly	through	which	he	evidently cognizes	that	it	exists,	and	another	concerning	the	faith	of	someone	else	by means	of	which	he is	not	able to	cognized	whether it	exists	or	not." (Ord. Prol.	q.1,	a.1,	[OTh	I,	41–42]) 23. To	this	effect,	Ockham	quotes	Augustine's	account	of	the	nature	of	a	wayfarer's knowledge	of	his	own	faith:	"This	...	can	be	confirmed	by	blessed	Augustine in De Trinitate 13,	chapter	1,	where	he	says:	'[T]he	faith	which	everyone	sees in	his	heart	if	he	believes,	or	does	not	see	if	he	does	not	believe,	we	know	in a	different	way	[than	we	know	other	things];	not	in	the	way	we	know	bodies	which	we	see	with	corporeal	eyes	and	which	-	via	images	of	them	-	we retain	in	memory	and	even	think	about	when	absent;	neither	is	it	in	the	way he	did16).	In	any	case,	even	if	Scotus	is	somewhat	ambivalent	about this, plenty of other thinkers are quite explicit in their rejection	of intellective	intuition	-	thinkers	including	Peter	Auriol	(d.	1322),	John of	Reading	(d.	1346),	and,	as	we'll	see,	Chatton	himself.17	In	rejecting intellective intuition,	such	authors	are	essentially	rejecting the idea that	we	possess	(at	least	in	this	life)	a	kind	of	non-sensory	or	"extrasensory"	mode	of	perception.18	As they	see it,	perceptual states	are one	and	all	sensory	states. Ockham	offers	a	variety	of	arguments	in	defense	of	intellective	intuitive	cognition.19	Among	the	most	compelling,	however,	is	what	I'll call	"the	argument	from	self-knowledge".	He	thinks	that	the	phenom16. Actually,	there	is	good	reason	for	supposing	that	Ockham	is	right	about	this. There	is	a	good	deal	of	textual	evidence	to	suggest	that	Scotus	took	seriously the	possibility	that	the	'intuitive'/'abstractive'	distinction	applies	not	only	at the level	of	sense	cognition	but	also	at the level intellect.	What is	more, it looks like the	reasons	he	has for taking this	possibility	seriously	are	much the	same	as	those	advanced	by	Ockham.	For	a	general	treatment	of	Scotus's theory	of	intuitive	cognition,	see	Dumont	1989,	Marenbon	1987	(Chapter	10), Pasnau	2003,	and	Wolter	1990. 17. For	Auriol's	account	of	intuition,	see	Friedman	2009.	Ockham's	student	and secretary, Adam	Wodeham, reports John of Reading as a critic (alongside Chatton)	of	the	view	that	the	intellect	is	capable	of	reflexive	intellective	intuition.	Presumably,	his	criticisms	on	this	score,	like	Chatton's,	are	part	of	a wholesale	rejection	of	the	notion	of	intellective	intuition.	See	Wodeham	1990 (Prol.	q.2,	a.2). 18. Interestingly,	even	those	who	are	unwilling	to	allow	for	direct	cognition	of our	own	states	in	this	life	often	allow	that	this	will	be	possible	in	the	afterlife (since,	at	that	point,	human	cognition	will	no	longer	be	restricted	to	sensible things but	will include purely intelligible things such as	God, angels, and one's	own	soul). 19. A	number	of	these	arguments	are	grounded	in	considerations	having	to	do with	the	nobility	and	immateriality	of	the	intellect.	Thus,	for	example,	Ockham	contends	that	that	whatever	can	be	cognized	by	lower,	sensory	powers can	also	be	cognized	by	the	intellect.	See	his	discussion	at	Rep.	II	qq.	12–13 (OTh,	284)	and	Ord.	Prol.	q.1,	a.1	(OTh	I,	45).	His	discussion	at	these	points looks	to	be	directly	influenced	by	Scotus.	Related	to	considerations	about	the nobility	of the intellect is	Ockham's insistence that	because	sense faculties cannot	act	with	efficient	causality	on	the	intellect,	it	cannot	be	the	case	that perceptual	judgments,	which	are	states	of	the	intellect,	have	acts	of	sensory intuition	as	their	immediate	cause.	Such	judgments	must	be	caused	by	acts	of intellective	intuition.	See	Ord.	Prol.	q.1,	a.1	(OTh	I,	22ff). susan	brower-toland Medieval Approaches to Consciousness: Ockham and Chatton philosophers'	imprint – 6 – vol.	12,	no.	17	(november	2012) are neither sensible nor do they fall under any sense. But the fact that such things are cognized intuitively and as particular is clear.	After all, the following is evidently	known	to	me: 'I	am	thinking'	(ego intellego).	Now, either this knowledge is (a) taken principally and immediately	from	a	simple	awareness	(notitia)	of	the	terms (or	the	things)	[that	comprise	this	proposition]	or	(b) it is	known	through	something	prior	and	better	known.	If it is known in the	first	way, (a), then, insofar as this is a contingent truth, it is	necessary that its terms (or the things	denoted	by	them)	are	seen	intuitively.	For,	if	they are cognized	merely abstractively then it	would	not be possible	by	means	of	such	an	act to	know	a	contingent truth	that	involves	certain	temporal	differentia.	(After	all, as	everyone	agrees,	this	sort	of	cognition	abstracts	from here and now.) Therefore, the fact that it is evidently cognized	requires	some intuitive	awareness.	But	clearly an	intuitive	awareness	of	me	[viz.,	the	thing	denoted	by "ego"]	does	not	suffice:	an	intuitive	awareness	of	the	act	of thinking	itself	is	required.	Therefore,	an	intellective	intuitive	awareness	is	required.	The	second	alternative	(b)	is not	to	be	granted,	however,	since	there	is	no	contingent truth	from	which	'I	think'	follows	necessarily.	(Ord.	Prol. q.1,	a.1	[OTh	I,	39–40]) 1.	We have evident knowledge of truths regarding our own	occurrent	mental	(i. e.,	non-sensory)	states. 2.	Such	knowledge	is	not	derived	from	our	senses. 3.	Therefore,	our	knowledge	of	such	truths	derives	from either (a) the intellect's (non-propositional)	cognition of	its	own	acts	or	(b)	inference	from	some	contingent truth	which	is	itself	evidently	known. will	become clearer	below,	Ockham	highlights	Augustine's characterization	of	knowledge	of	our	mental	states	as	involving	a	kind	of inner, non-corporeal "vision" of them.24	He also specifically notes the	fact	that,	on	Augustine's	account,	the	domain	of	self-knowledge includes both occurrent sensory states as well as purely rational states	-	namely,	states	of	intellect	and	will	(such	as occurrent	beliefs and	desires).25 The	argument from	self-knowledge is	designed to show that the best	(indeed,	the	only)	explanation	for	our	possession	of	such	knowledge requires the introduction of intuitive cognition at the level of intellect.26 The core of that argument (together	with	my	own	more formal	reconstruction	of	it)	runs	as	follows: It	is	clear	that,	in	this	life,	our	intellect	not	only	cognizes sensible things	but	also cognizes intuitively	and	as	particular	certain	intelligible	things	that	do	not	fall	under	the senses	any	more	than	a	separated	substance	falls	under the	senses.	To	this	category	belong	thoughts,	acts	of	will, and the ensuing	delight and sadness.	A	human can experience	things	of	this	sort	as	being	in	himself,	but	they that	we	know	those	things	which	we	have	not	seen...'	On	the	basis	of	this authority,	it	is	clear	that	this	faith	which	pertains	to	no	bodily	sense	(just	as	he claims	in	the	second	chapter	[of	De Trinitate	13])	can	be	cognized	by	a	single awareness	[notitia]	which	suffices	for	judging	whether	or	not	it	exists."	(Ord. Prol.	q.1,	a.1	[OTh	I,	29–30]) 24.	Ockham	pays	special	attention	to,	and	quotes	at	great	length,	Augustine's	account	(in	the	early	sections	of	De Trinitate 13)	of	the	way	in	which	the	Christian	wayfarer	"sees"	(videt)	his	own	faith	and	his	own	acts	of	will.	See,	e. g., texts	cited	in	notes	22	and	23	just	above. 25. Regarding the domain of self-knowledge, Ockham notes that Augustine specifically	says	we	can	have	knowledge	of	our	faith	(which	is	an	intellective	state)	and	then	observes	that	"Augustine	says	the	same	thing	concerning	the	will	in	chapter	3	[of De Trinitate 13]".	(Ord.	Prol.	q.1,	a.1	[OTh,	I,	43]) 26.	Ockham	rehearses	the	argument	from	self-knowledge	at	two	points.	As	there is no significant difference	between the two, I restrict	my attention to the second	and	simpler	statement	of	it.	The	first	argument	occurs	at	Ord.	Prol.	q.1, a.1	(OTh	I,	28).	A	similar	but	more	abbreviated	version	of	the	argument	can be	found	at	Quodl. I.14. susan	brower-toland Medieval Approaches to Consciousness: Ockham and Chatton philosophers'	imprint – 7 – vol.	12,	no.	17	(november	2012) with some plausibility that only a non-sensory form of cognition can	explain facts	about the domain	of self-knowledge.	His	contention	that	the	form	of	cognition	in	question	is intuitive	gains	traction from	the	Augustinian	picture	of nature	of	such	knowledge.	As	we have	seen,	intuitive	cognition	is	introduced	specifically	to	account for non-inferential knowledge of contingent, present matters of fact.	Given	this,	the	appeal	to	such	a	mode	of	cognition	at	the	intellective	level	provides	a	nice	explanation	not	only	of	the	content	of introspective judgments (viz., contingent facts regarding	my current states), but also	of their immediacy. Indeed,	Ockham thinks that	Augustine's propensity to characterize self-knowledge using visual	metaphors	makes it all the	more fitting that the cognitive mechanism	that	underlies	it	should	turn	out	to	be	a	species	of	perception.	And,	given	that intuition	is	defined	precisely in	terms	of its	relation	to	evident	judgments,	Ockham	maintains	that	appealing to	intuition	as	the	basis	for	self-knowledge	provides	a	straightforward	explanation	for	its	privileged	status.	Finally,	insofar	Ockham supposes that one can intuitively cognize	only	one's	own	mental states, the introduction	of intellective intuition	also	squares	with first-person	authority.28 Although	Ockham's	primary	aim	in	offering	the	argument	from	selfknowledge	is	to	establish	intuitive	cognition	at	the	level	of	intellect,	it turns	out	that	the	argument	(if	correct)	establishes	something	rather more. For	what self-knowledge requires is not	merely the introduction	of intellective intuition	but the introduction	of	higher-order -	or what	Ockham	himself refers to as "reflexive"	-	intellective intuition. The	argument	from	self-knowledge,	thus,	establishes	that	the	intellect is	aware	not	only	of	objects	in	the	world	but	also	-	via	acts	of	reflexive intuition	-	of	its	own	first-order	states. Insofar as	Chatton	wants to resist the introduction intellective intuition,	he	likewise	rejects	the	idea	that	self-knowledge	requires higher-order, or reflexive, intellective intuition. Before turning to 28.	See	text	cited	at	note	22.	On	the	face	of	it,	however,	the	claim	seems	merely stipulative.	As	we'll	see,	it	is	not	clear	how	Ockham	can	justify	it. 4.	Not	(b),	since	"there	is	no	contingent	truth	from	which	'I am	thinking'	follows	necessarily". 5.	Therefore,	(a). 6.	This	knowledge	derives	from	either	(i)	abstractive	cognition	of	one's	own	acts	or	(ii)	intuitive	cognition	of	one's own	acts. 7. It doesn't derive from (i), since abstractive cognition cannot ground knowledge regarding	my current	mental states. 8.	It	derives	from	(ii). 9.	There	is	intuitive	cognition	at	the	level	of	intellect. The	argument is fairly straightforward.	Ockham	begins	with the relatively uncontroversial observation that we possess introspective knowledge	regarding	our	subjective	states	-	in	this	case,	he	appeals to	an	example	involving	an intellective	state,	namely,	knowledge	that I'm thinking (intellego). The argument then proceeds by process of elimination:	such	knowledge	cannot	be	derived	from	the	senses	(the object	of	such	knowledge	isn't	corporeal	entity,	hence	isn't	accessible to	the	senses);	it	cannot	be	inferred	from	any	other	truth	known	to	us (at	least	not	in	a	way	that	preserves	its	evidentness);27	and,	finally,	it isn't	had	on the	basis	of	abstractive	cognition	(since	such	cognition wouldn't	yield	awareness	of	my	occurrent	states).	Thus,	it	must	be	the result	of	an	act	of	intellective	intuitive	cognition. The	argument	is,	of	course,	helped	by	Ockham's	choice	of	example.	By	focusing	on	"thoughts	and	acts	of	will",	he	is	able	to	argue 27. Here,	I	take	it	that	what	Ockham	means	is	that	the	proposition	'I'm	thinking' does	not	follow	necessarily	from	any	proposition	that	doesn't	already	presuppose	knowledge that I'm thinking.	Obviously, there	are	some	propositions from	which	'I'm	thinking'	does	follow	necessarily.	For	example,	'I'm	thinking' necessarily	follows	from	'I'm	thinking	about	this	argument'	or 'I	know	that I'm	thinking',	etc.	But	these	examples	beg	the	question,	since	knowledge	of such	propositions	presupposes	the	very	thing	we're	trying	to	explain. susan	brower-toland Medieval Approaches to Consciousness: Ockham and Chatton philosophers'	imprint – 8 – vol.	12,	no.	17	(november	2012) stroke).29 "Evident assent", in Ockham's vocabulary, is a form of knowledge.30 Ockham	thinks	that	this	same	structure	applies	whether	the	object in	question	is	external	or internal. If the	object is	external, the	intuition in	question is	what	Ockham	calls	a "direct"	or	what	we	might call	a	"first-order"	act.	But	if	the	object	of	the	intuition	is	itself	a	mental state, the intuition is "reflexive",	or	higher-order.31 In	either	case, however,	Ockham	supposes	that,	provided	the	object	in	question	is sufficiently	proximate	to	the	cognizer,	there	will	be	an	intuitive	cognition	of	it.32	Thus,	just	as	the	presence	of	an	external	object	causes 29. "If	[an	intuitive	cognition]	is	naturally	caused,	then	it	cannot	exist	unless	the object	exists	and	is	present	in	the	required	proximity.	This	is	because	there can	be	such	a	distance	between	the	object	and	the	power	that	the	power	cannot	(naturally)	intuit	the	object.	But	when	the	object	is	present	and	in	proximity	in	such	a	way,	the	intellect	(through	an	act	of	assent)	can,	in	the	aforesaid way,	judge	that	the	thing	exists."	(Rep	II	12–13	[OTh	V,	258]) 30.	The diagram and this summary involve some oversimplification. On	Ockham's	view,	in	the	natural	order,	perception	actually	involves	two	acts	of	intuitive	cognition:	one	at the	level	of the	senses	and	another	at the	level	of intellect.	(As	he	says,	"Naturally,	the	intellect	intuits	nothing	unless	by	means of the	senses	existing in their	act..."	[Rep. II	qq.12–13	(OTh	V,	285)].)	Thus, strictly	speaking,	perception	of	some	object,	O,	would	begin	with	a	sensory intuitive	awareness	of	O,	which	in	turn	occasions	an	intellective	intuitive	cognition	of	O.	The	act	of	intellective	intuition	then	efficiently	causes	the	formation	(in	the	intellect)	of	one	or	more	judgments	regarding	O. 31. As	will	become	clear,	Ockham	holds	that	direct	(or	first-order)	states	are	always	numerically	distinct	from	the	reflexive	(or	higher-order)	states	that	take them as object. Even so, both he and	Chatton explicitly recognize the possibility that	numerically	one	state	could	be	both	direct	and	reflexive in the sense	that	a	single	state	could	possess	both	firstand	second-order	content. A	case	in	point	would	be	a	self-representing	state	-	i. e.,	a	state	which	represents	both	an	external	object	and	itself.	(More	on	self-representation	below.) For	the	sake	of	clarity,	in	what	follows,	I	restrict	the	term	"higher-order	state" for	reflexive	states	that	are	numerically	distinct	from	the	direct,	or	first-order, states	they	take	as	objects. 32. In	the	case	of	reflexive	intuition,	just	how	to	understand	the	notion	of	"proximity"	is	unclear.	In	many	cases,	Ockham	will	speak	as	if	intellective	states are	self-intimating:	that	is,	he	suggests	that	the	mere	presence	of	a	first-order	intellective	act	is	sufficient	to	cause	higher-order	awareness	of	it.	Other times,	however,	he	is	more	cautious	and	speaks	as	if	some	minimal	form	of attention	(or	lack	of	distraction)	is	required	in	order	for	the	first-order	state Chatton's objections, however, we need to look a bit	more closely at the account of self-knowledge that emerges from	Ockham's argument. 1.3 Self-Knowledge and Higher-Order Intuition As	is	perhaps	by	now	clear,	self-knowledge,	on	Ockham's	view,	turns out	to	be	a	variety	of	perceptual	knowledge.	To	see	this,	consider	Figure	1	below,	which	represents	(very schematically)	Ockham's	account of	the	general	structure	of	perceptual	knowledge. Figure 1. The General Structure of Perceptual Knowledge As the	diagram indicates, in	ordinary	cases,	perception	begins	with some	worldly	object,	O.	On	Ockham's	view,	the	presence	and	proximity	of	the	object	brings	about	in	the	cognizer	an	act	of	intuitive	cognition,	I(O).	This	cognition,	in	turn,	leads	to	the	formation	of	and	evident	assent	to	a	perceptual	judgment	regarding	the	existence	of	the object	intuited	(in	the	foregoing,	assent	is	indicated	by	the	judgment susan	brower-toland Medieval Approaches to Consciousness: Ockham and Chatton philosophers'	imprint – 9 – vol.	12,	no.	17	(november	2012) Now,	if	we	apply	the	foregoing	account	to	a	particular	instance	of self-knowledge,	we	get	something	like	the	following	picture: Figure 2. The Structure of Self-Knowledge (of an Intellective State) Figure 2 represents	Ockham's account of the basic structure of selfknowledge.	In	this	case,	it's	knowledge	of	one's	first-order	perceptual state	(namely,	perception	of	a	rock).	On	this	picture, there is, in the first	place, a	direct intellective intuition	of the rock, I(r).35	The	presence	of	this	first-order	intuition	generates	both	a	first-order	perceptual judgment	(├	'there	is	a	rock'),	as	well	as	a	higher-order	intuitive	cognition,	I(I(r)),	which	takes	that	first-order	intuition	as	object.	Finally,	the reflexive	intuition,	in	its	turn,	generates	a	reflexive	judgment	-	namely,	a	self-attributing	belief	regarding	the	occurrence	of	the	first-order act	(├	'I(r)	exists	in	me').	As	Figure	2	makes	clear,	therefore,	the	structure	of	self-knowledge	parallels	that	of	perceptual	knowledge;	indeed, it's	just	a	higher-order	iteration	of	Ockham's	general	model	of	perception.	And this,	of course, is the	principle aim	of the	argument from 35. Here,	too,	for	simplicity,	I	ignore	the	role	played	by	senses	in	perception.	As noted	above	(see	note	30),	perception	would	begin	with	sensory	intuition	of the	rock,	which	intuition	would	give	rise	to	intellective	intuition	of	the	rock. a	direct	intuition	of	it,	the	presence	of	a	first-order	state	generates	a reflexive	act	of	intuition	-	one	which	takes	that	first-order	state	as	its object.33	Ockham	is	explicit,	moreover,	that	the	higher-order	state	in question	will	be	numerically	distinct from	that	which it takes	as its object.34	As	he	says, An	act	by	which	we	think	of	an	object	outside	the	mind	is called	a	"direct"	act,	and	the	act	by	which	that	direct	act	is itself	is	thought	of	is	called	a	"reflexive"	act.	...	[Additionally,] I	maintain that the	direct	act	and	the	reflexive	act are	not	a	single	act.	(Quodl.	II.12	[OTh	IX,	165]) Ockham's	insistence	on	this	point	entails	that,	on	his	view,	cognitive acts	are	never self-reflexive	-	that is, they	never take themselves	as objects.	Thus,	in	a	passage	that	comes	immediately	before	that	cited just	above,	he	tells	us	that ...	acts	may	not,	properly	speaking,	be	taken	to	be	both	direct	and	reflexive,	since	what	is	properly	called	"reflexive" begins from a given thing and terminates in that same thing.	Likewise,	properly	speaking,	no	single	act	is	called "reflexive".	(Ibid.) to	generate	a	reflexive	intuition.	I	consider	these	aspects	of	Ockham's	view more	fully	elsewhere. 33.	Ockham	holds that	only	first-order	states	cause	higher-order	acts	of	awareness	directed	at	them.	Second-order	states	do	not	likewise	immediately	generate third-order reflexive	acts.	Ockham's	view	seems to	be that, generally speaking,	we	are	not	aware	of	higher-order	states. 34.	He	makes the	same	claim in the	context	of	his	Ordinatio	discussion	of	selfknowledge:	"I	say	that	properly	and	strictly	speaking	there	are	no	reflexive acts	of	thinking	since,	strictly	taken,	something	that	is	'reflexive'	includes	less than	two	things,	as	is	clear	in	the	case	of	local	reflexive	motion.	But	taking 'reflexive'	broadly	I	concede	that	[an	intellective	awareness	of	one's	own	acts] is reflexive	-	even	so, there's	nothing	against its	also	being intuitive." (Ord. Prol.	q.1,	a.1	[OTh	I,	43–44]) susan	brower-toland Medieval Approaches to Consciousness: Ockham and Chatton philosophers'	imprint – 10 – vol.	12,	no.	17	(november	2012) 2.1 Higher-Order Intuition is Insufficient to Account for Self-Knowledge Chatton offers two arguments for the claim that higher-order intellective intuition can't itself explain the phenomena associated	with Augustinian	self-knowledge.	To	see	what	these	arguments	are,	let	us consider	again	the	case	of	a	subject	-	call	her	S	-	who	is	consciously thinking	about	a	rock.38	Now,	if	S	is	aware	that	she's	thinking	about	a rock,	then,	according	to	both	Ockham	and	Chatton,	S	will	know	-	immediately,	with	utter	certainty,	and	in	a	distinctively	authoritative	matter	-	both	that	she	is	thinking	and	that	she's	thinking	about a rock. The problem	with	Ockham's	account,	as	Chatton	sees	it,	is	that	it	fails	to account	for	these	two	features	of	self-knowledge.	In	other	words,	on his	view,	the	introduction	of	higher-order	intellective	intuition	doesn't itself provide the	means to account for S's (immediate, certain, and authoritative)	knowledge	of	the	content	of	her	thoughts	nor	even	of	the fact	that	such	a	thought	is	occurring.39 Let's	begin	by	considering	the	charge	that	a	higher-order	account cannot explain knowledge of the content of one's conscious states. Here's	how	Chatton	frames	it: [On	your	account,	Ockham,]	I	would,	by	virtue	of	a	[higher-order] vision, be certain either that (a) I'm thinking of	a	rock,	or	I	would	be	certain	only	that	(b)	I	am	thinking	(but	as	to	whether	or	not	there	is	a	rock,	about	this	I would	not	be	certain,	in	virtue	of	that	vision).	Now,	you [Ockham]	cannot	accept	the	first	option	[viz.	(a)],	since 38.	The	example itself I take from	Chatton	and	Ockham	-	and it is	a	standard example	in	medieval	discussions	of	cognition.	Even	Augustine,	at	De Trinitate 11.2,	in	the	course	of	his	discussion	of	sense	perception,	lists	a	stone	as	among the	kinds	of	thing	which	might	serve	as	the	object	of	an	act	of	perception.	It may	be	that	the	example	traces	ultimately	to	Aristotle's	discussion	of	knowledge	in	De Anima and, in	particular,	to	his	example	at	3.8,	the	soul's	knowing a	stone	via	its	possession	of	the	form	of	the	stone. 39.	To	be	clear:	When	speaking	of	content, I'm	presupposing	an internalist	notion	of	content.	Thus,	in	the	case	of	being	certain	that	I'm	seeing	a	rock,	Augustine	holds	that	what	I'm	certain	of	is	that	I	am	having	a	perception	as-ofa-rock.	But	he	does	not	suppose	that	certainty	includes	knowing	that	there	is, in	fact,	a	rock. self-knowledge:	namely,	to	establish	that	self-knowledge	requires	acts of	higher-order	intellective	intuition. More	could	be	said	both	about	the	details	of	Ockham's	account	of self-knowledge	and	the	motivations	for	it,	but	this	suffices,	I	think,	to demonstrate	the	basic	contours	of	his	view.	Let's	turn	now	to	Chatton's views	-	both	to	his	objections	to	Ockham's	account	and	his	proposed alternative. 2. Against Higher-Order Intuition: Chatton's Alternative Account of Self-Knowledge Chatton is among those	who	deny the existence	of intuitive cognition	at	the	level	of	intellect.	For	the	same	reason,	he	wants	to	resist the	introduction	of	reflexive	acts	of	intellective	intuition	and,	hence, Ockham's	account	of	self-knowledge	as	a	whole.36 In	responding	to Ockham's	account,	he	pursues	three	main	lines	of	objection:	first,	he argues	that	the	postulation	of	reflexive	intellective	intuition	is insufficient	to	account	for	Augustinian-style	self-knowledge;	second,	that	it is	unnecessary to	account	for	such	knowledge;	and,	third,	that	it	gives rise to an infinite regress in intuitive acts. Chatton gives the lion's share	of	his	attention	to	the	last	of	these	three	lines	of	criticism	-	indeed,	by	my	count,	he	develops	three	distinct	types	of	infinite-regress argument against	Ockham's position (and even offers	multiple versions	of	each).	But	because	the	first	two	lines	of	criticism	are	the	most important	for	understanding	his	own	positive	account	of	self-knowledge	as	well	as its	motivation, I focus	on	them	in	what	follows.37 (I will,	however,	have	reason	consider	one	of	his infinite-regress	arguments	in	Section	3	below.) 36.	Chatton devotes an entire section of his own treatment of intuitive cognition	to	the	question	of	self-knowledge	-	namely,	at	a.5	of	q.2	of	his	Sentences Prologue.	(See	Chatton	1989.)	His	discussion	in	this	context	is	essentially	a sustained	critique	of	Ockham's	own	earlier	treatment	of	the	issue. 37. A	more	detailed	discussion	of	the	infinite-regress	arguments	can	be	found	in Putallaz	2005. susan	brower-toland Medieval Approaches to Consciousness: Ockham and Chatton philosophers'	imprint – 11 – vol.	12,	no.	17	(november	2012) 2.	If	(A),	then	(given	Ockham's	account)	self-knowledge	lacks first-person	authority	regarding	the	content	of	one's	states. 3.	But	self-knowledge	does	involve	first-person	authority	regarding	the	content	of	one's	states. 4.	Not	(A). 5. If (B), then	self-knowledge	doesn't include	knowledge	of the	content	of	one's	(occurrent)	states. 6.	But	self-knowledge	does	include	knowledge	of	the	content of	one's	(occurrent)	states. 7.	Not	(B). 8.	Ockham's	account	of	self-knowledge	is	false. The	crucial	premise,	of	course,	is	the	second.	Here	Chatton's	claim	is that	if,	as	Ockham	supposes,	S's	knowledge	regarding	the	content	of her	thought	owes	to	the	existence	of	another	state	distinct	from	it	and directed	upon	it,	then	it	won't	be	possible	to	preserve	the	first-person authority	associated	with	self-knowledge.	For,	as	Chatton	explains,	on such	an	account	"it	will	turn	out	that	an	angel	could	[also]	be	certain that	[S	is]	thinking	of	a	rock	and	thus	wouldn't	[even]	need	communication	or	illumination	[in	order	to	know	S's	thoughts]".	And	this	is because,	in	principle,	an	angel	could,	as	it	were,	just	peer	into	her	head and	come	to	know	the	content	of	her	thoughts	in	just	the	way	she	herself	does	-	namely,	via	an intuitive	cognition	of them.	Indeed, there appears to	be	nothing in	Ockham's	account that could	explain	how the	angel's	knowledge	of	S's	thoughts	differs	from	S's	own.	But,	then, it's	hard	to	see	how	the	subject's	access	to	her	own	states	is	unique	or privileged	or	how	she	is	an	authority	regarding	her	own	states.	Hence the	first	horn	must	be	rejected.42 42. Chatton	goes	on,	in	the	passage,	to	offer	independent	evidence	that	Ockham is	committed	to	the	rejection	of	option	(A).	According	to	Chatton,	Ockham	in other	contexts	appears	committed	to	the	claim	that	one	angel	-	Gabriel,	let's say	-	cannot	know the thoughts	of another angel	-	Michael, say	-	just via if	you	did,	it	would	turn	out	that	an	angel	could	[also]	be certain	that	you	are	thinking	of	a	rock	and	thus	wouldn't need	communication	or illumination [in	order to	know your thoughts]. But you yourself think this false, since elsewhere	you	suppose	that	when	an	angel	sees	the	cognition	of	another	angel,	nevertheless	he	does	not	know what	the	object	of	that	cognition	is.	Nor	can	you	accept the	second	[viz.	(b)], since	I	am	as	certain	that	I	am	thinking	of	a	rock	as	that I	am	thinking.	(Reportatio et Lectura super Sent.	I	Prol.	q.2,	a.5,	122) Admittedly,	the	way	Chatton	states	the	argument	is	a	bit	complicated. One	part	of	the	complication	owes	to	his	appealing	to	claims	Ockham makes in	other	contexts	about	angelic	mind-reading;40	another	part owes	to	the	fact	that	his	interpretation	of	such	claims	is	controversial.41 But	none	of	this	vitiates	the	overall	thrust	of	his	argument	-	the	gist of	which	is	clear	enough.	Basically,	Chatton	proceeds	by	arguing	that Ockham's	account	presents	a	dilemma	both	the	horns	of	which	Ockham	himself	is committed	to	rejecting. Taking	our	example	of	a	subject,	S,	consciously thinking	about	a rock	again,	we	can	represent	his	argument	this	way: 1.	If	Ockham's	account	of	self-knowledge	is	correct,	then	when S	is	consciously	aware	of	her	thought	of	a	rock,	S	must	know with	certainty	either	(A)	both	that	she	is	thinking	and	that she	is	thinking	about	a	rock	or	(B)	only	that	she	is	thinking (and	hence	not	also	that	she's	thinking	of	a	rock). 40. E. g.,	Ockham's	discussion	at	Quodl. I.6	and	at	Rep.	II.16	(see	OTh	V,	377) 41. Ockham	doesn't	claim,	as	Chatton's	gloss	suggests, that	an	angel	-	Gabriel, say	-	cannot	know	anything	about	the	content	of	another	angel's	-	say,	Michael's	-	act of cognition	when	he	perceives	Michael's	mental acts.	Rather, what	Ockham	claims	is	that,	in	certain	cases	-	namely,	ones	in	which	Michael is	intuitively	cognizing	some	singular	object	-	Gabriel	will	be	unable	to	determine	precisely which entity	(among	several	exactly	resembling	individuals) is	the	object	of	Michael's	intuitive	act. susan	brower-toland Medieval Approaches to Consciousness: Ockham and Chatton philosophers'	imprint – 12 – vol.	12,	no.	17	(november	2012) Figure 3. Chatton's Skeptical Scenario Assuming	such	a	scenario	is	possible,	Chatton	wants	to	know:	Will the	subject assent to (i. e.,	believe)	the	self-attributing	proposition	or not?	Either	answer,	he	thinks,	will	be	unpalatable	for	Ockham.	Here, too,	therefore,	his	argument	is	best	understood	as	taking	the	form	of a	dilemma.	Chatton's own statement of the argument (once again with my more formal reconstruction) runs as follows: Suppose	God	were to conserve in the	mind [of S] this thought:	'The	act	of	thinking	of	a	rock	exists	in	me.'	And suppose he were to introduce alongside it a [higherorder]	vision	of	the	act	of	thinking	to	which	the	subject term	of	that	thought	refers.	If	he	did	so	when	the	[lowerorder]	act	of	thinking	did	not	in	fact	exist,	then	perhaps, at	this	point	(i. e.,	with	only	that	thought	and	the	[higherorder]	vision	existing in the soul) it	would	not	be sufficient	for	generating	assent	to	the	thing	signified	by	that thought	-	or	at	least	not	the	sort	of	assent	that	is	caused by intuitive cognition.	... The first assumption is clear, since	the	soul	does	not	seem	to	be	of	such	a	nature	that it	would	be	disposed	to	cause	an	assent	that	it	is	thinking [of	something]	when	it	is	not	thinking	of	it.	After	all,	nothing is	more	certain to the	soul than the	existence	of its own	act.	Therefore,	if	the	soul	were	disposed	to	cause	an To	be	sure,	it's	not	at	all	clear	what	advantage	is	had	by	taking	the second	horn	of the	dilemma	-	at least	when it comes to	preserving first-person authority.	After all, even if higher-order intuition yields only	knowledge	about	the	occurrence	(but	not	about	the	content)	of my	thoughts,	it	remains	the	case	that	any	angel	intuitively	gazing	upon my	states	will	know	just	as	much	about	them	as	I	know	via reflexive intuition.	Then	again, it	may	be that	Chatton is supposing that	firstperson	authority	extends	only to	knowledge	of the	content	of	one's states.	But	whatever the	case	may	be,	Chatton rules	out the second horn	on	other	grounds.	For,	as	he	points	out,	if	higher-order	intuition does	not	give	S	access	to	the	content	of	her	first-order	thought,	then there	is	another	datum	of	self-knowledge	for	which	Ockham	has	failed to	account:	namely,	the	fact	that	self-knowledge	involves	certainty	regarding	the	content	of	one's	own	current	states. This	objection	exploits	the	fact	that,	on	Ockham's	account,	a	subject's	awareness	of	her	occurrent	thoughts	owes	to	the	presence	of	a state that is	distinct from	and	a representation	of those thoughts	of which	she	is	aware.	Indeed,	it	is	precisely	this	feature	of	the	account that	allows	for	the	possibility	that	someone	other	than	S	could	know as	much	about	her	subjective	states	(and	in	precisely	the	same	way)	as she	herself	does.	This	same	feature	of	the	account	also	allows	for	the possibility	of	error.	Thus,	as	Chatton	attempts	to	show	in	the	second of	his two	arguments,	Ockham's theory fails to	account	not	only for first-person authority but also for the certainty associated	with selfknowledge.	In	order	to	show	this,	he	constructs	a	scenario	in	which God	is	causing	a	person	who	has	a	second-order	intuition	of	first-order	thought	of	a	rock	to	entertain	this	self-attributing	thought:	'I'm	perceiving	a	rock.'	In	the	scenario,	however,	there	is,	in	fact,	no	first-order perception	of	a	rock.	So,	basically,	Chatton	is	constructing	a	scenario in	which	we	have	a	targetless	higher-order	state.	Here's	the	idea: intuitively	cognizing	them.	Whether	or	not	Chatton	is	right	in	ascribing	this view	to	Ockham,	his	idea	is	just	this:	If	it's	the	case	that	angel	Gabriel	cannot know	the	content	of	angel	Michael's	thoughts	just	by	directly	perceiving	Michael's	intellective	acts,	it's	not	clear	why	we	should	think	Michael	can	know his own	thoughts	in	this	way. susan	brower-toland Medieval Approaches to Consciousness: Ockham and Chatton philosophers'	imprint – 13 – vol.	12,	no.	17	(november	2012) objects.43	He	thinks	that,	in	such	cases,	the	intuition	gives	rise	to	an evident	judgment	(and,	hence,	certainty)	that	the	object	intuited	does not exist.44 Yet,	while such a response is available to	Ockham, as a rejoinder	to	Chatton's	objection,	it	doesn't	help	his	case	much,	since the	position	it	leaves	him	with	is	implausible	at	best.	After	all,	it	commits	him	to	saying	S	knows	herself not	to	be	in	a	state	she	seems	to	be aware	of	being	in.	Indeed,	she	knows	herself	not	to	be	in	this	state	just in virtue of	her	seeming	to	be	in	it.	An	odd	strategy	for	preserving	the security	of	self-knowledge!45 Whether	or	not	Ockham	has	a	plausible	response,	the	upshot	of	the argument	is	clear	enough.	Chatton's	point	-	both	here	and	in	the	previous	argument	about	self-knowledge	regarding	content	of	conscious states	-	is	simply	that	if,	as	Ockham	supposes,	our	awareness	of	conscious	states	owes	to	a	distinct,	higher-order	representation	of	them, it	will	turn	out	that	the	resulting	form	of	awareness	is	insufficient	to account for the various	phenomena it	was introduced to explain. If consciousness	is	a	matter	of	higher-order	perception,	self-knowledge will	turn	out	to	be	less	than	utterly	direct,	less	than	utterly	secure,	and in	no	sense	first-person	authoritative. 2.2 Higher-Order Intuition is Unnecessary to Account for Self-Knowledge Chatton	maintains	not	only	that	higher-order	intuitive	states	are	insufficient	to	account	for	the	phenomena	associated	with	self-knowledge but	also	that	their	postulation	is	unnecessary.	On	his	view,	all	the	phenomena	can	be	preserved	without	appeal	to	any	acts	of	intellective	intuition.	As	he	says	at	one	point:	"[I]t	is	superfluous	to	posit	[reflexive] 43. Since	Chatton	is	aware	of	Ockham's	views	on	this	score,	it's	not	clear	why	he doesn't	anticipate	such	a	rejoinder. 44. E. g.,	Ord.	Prol.,	q.1	(OTh I,	30–31) 45. One	might	also	wonder	whether	Ockham	could	respond	by	simply	grasping the	second	horn	of	the	dilemma.	Perhaps,	but	doing	so	would	require	him to revise	his general account	of perception (since it is that account	which commits	him	to	the	claim	that	a	reflexive	intuition	is	sufficient	for	self-knowledge).	Also,	it	would	still	leave	him	vulnerable	to	all	the	problems	raised	by the	possibility	of	targetless	higher-order	states. assent	that	an	act	of	thinking	of	a	rock	exists	when	it	does not	exist,	it	would,	therefore,	be	disposed	to	cause	an	error	in	itself,	regarding	what	is	most	certain	to	it.	(Reportatio et Lectura super Sent.	Prol.	q.2,	a.5,	123) 1.	It	is	possible	(via	divine	intervention)	that	a	subject,	S, could have a higher-order intuition of a nonexistent first-order	state. 2.	In	such	a	case,	the	higher-order	intuition	would	either (A) cause S to assent to a self-attributing proposition (e. g.,	'I'm	perceiving	a	rock')	or	else	(B)	not	cause	this. 3. If (A), it follows	that	S	could	be in	error	about things that	are	most	certain	to	her	-	namely,	about	the	occurrence	of	her	own	states.	This	is	absurd. 4.	Not	(A). 5. If (B), then	higher-order intuition is	not sufficient for self-knowledge. 6. But higher-order intuition is (on	Ockham's view) sufficient	for	self-knowledge. 7.	Not	(B). Since	Ockham	famously	allows	for	cases	of	supernaturally	induced	intuitive	cognition	of	nonexistent	objects,	he	wouldn't,	presumably,	object	to	the	first	premise.	But	he	would	most	certainly	reject	its	second premise	on	the	grounds	that	it	presents	a	false	dichotomy.	There	is,	after	all,	a	further	possibility:	namely,	that	the	higher-order	intuition	will lead	S	to	assent	to	some	self-attributing	proposition	-	not	to	the	proposition	that	she is	perceiving	of	a	rock	but	rather to the	proposition that	she	is	not perceiving	of	a	rock	(or	that	she	seems	to	be	perceiving of a rock but is not). Indeed, this is precisely	what	Ockham claims in	cases	of	supernaturally	induced	intuitive	cognition	of	nonexistent susan	brower-toland Medieval Approaches to Consciousness: Ockham and Chatton philosophers'	imprint – 14 – vol.	12,	no.	17	(november	2012) by [sensory] intuitive	cognitions),	all that is required is that	the	[first-order]	thought	[of	a	rock]	be	received	in	the mind.	This	suffices	since	that	thought	is	suited	to	cause an	assent	with	respect	to	itself	without	the	mediation	of any act of intuitive cognition	of it. (Reportatio et Lectura super Sent.	Prol.	q.2,	a.5,	121) As	Chatton	here	suggests,	if	I	am	thinking	about	a	rock,	I	am	thereby already	able	to	know	or	judge	with	certainty	that	I'm	thinking	about	a rock.	No	need	for	any	higher-order	intuition	of	this	thought. The	nuances	of	Chatton's	account	will	take	some	time	to	develop, but	we	can	begin	by	representing	the	account	this	way: Figure 4. Chatton on the Structure of Self-Knowledge (of an Intellective State) As	it	stands,	Figure	4	involves	some	oversimplification,	which	I'll	eventually	need	to	redress.	For	now,	however, it	suffices	to	highlight the most	important	features	of	Chatton's	account.	Three	things,	in	particular,	are	worth	noting. First,	note	that	the	example	Chatton	uses	is	one	in	which	the	state the subject is aware	of is	not	an	occurrent	perception	of a rock	but vision",	because	"our	mind	cannot	see	its	own	acts intuitively,	nor is it	necessary	to	suppose	that	it	can	in	order	to	account	for	its	having certitude	with	respect	to	those	acts".46	For	obvious	reasons,	it	is	in	the course	of	developing	this	line	of	objection	that	Chatton's	own	(allegedly	more	parsimonious)	account	of	self-knowledge	emerges. When	it	comes	to	developing	such	an	alternative	account	of	selfknowledge,	Chatton's	primary	contention is that	knowledge	of	our own occurrent states owes not to any higher-order awareness or representation	of	them	but	rather	to	some	feature	internal	to	those states	themselves: When	I	am	certain	that	I	am	thinking	of	a	rock,	it	is	not necessary	to	say	that	this	owes	to	a	[higher-order]	vision of it; rather it owes	merely to the fact that the thought itself is received in the	mind. (Reportatio et Lectura super Sent.	Prol.	q.2,	a.5,	123) As	Chatton	here	indicates,	he	thinks	that	evident	assent	to	a	self-attributing	proposition	can	be	accounted	for	without	the	introduction	of	acts reflexive	intuition.	Indeed,	he	insists	that	our	knowledge	of	our	subjective	states	requires	merely	the	occurrence	of	those	states	themselves.47 I say that that the	soul	assents to the thing	signified	by this 'I am thinking about a rock' without any intuitive act.	And	this	is	because,	in	addition	to	this	propositional thought	'I	am	thinking	about	a	rock'	(which	is	composed of	abstractive	cognitions	which	may	or	may	not	be	caused 46. Rep.	Prol.	q.2,	a.5,	126.	Chatton	qualifies	this	claim	by	saying	that	it	holds	true only	"in	this	life".	Indeed,	in	other	places,	Chatton	explicitly	allows	that	postmortem	humans	may	indeed	be	capable	of	intellective	intuition	-	both	direct and	reflexive. 47. In	this	passage,	Chatton	speaks	as	if	the	mere	presence	of	the	thought	of the rock is sufficient for introspective knowledge of it. Strictly speaking, however,	it	turns	out	that	this	is	not	the	case;	something	further	is	required. But	because	this	further	requirement	is	not	an	act	of	higher-order	intuition, I'll	ignore	this	complication	for	the	moment.	I	shall	return	to	it	in	Section 3.2	below. susan	brower-toland Medieval Approaches to Consciousness: Ockham and Chatton philosophers'	imprint – 15 – vol.	12,	no.	17	(november	2012) more,	they	also	end	up	with	similar	analyses	of	its	basic	structure.48 For	both	thinkers,	self-knowledge	takes	the	form	of	introspective	beliefs	or	judgments	-	that	is,	assent	to	higher-order,	propositional	representations	of lower-order	states.	Finally,	and	most	significantly for our	purposes, they	each	hold	that	such	knowledge isn't the	only,	or even the	most basic,	mode of self-awareness. Rather, their analysis of	self-knowledge	presupposes	the	existence	of	an	independent	and more	basic	(sub-doxastic	and	non-propositional)	awareness	of	one's states.	As they see it, a subject cannot	know - i. e., immediately cognize	and	evidently	judge-that	she	is	perceiving	a	rock,	if	the	very	act of	perceiving the rock is	one	of	which she is	wholly	unconscious.49 Thus, for both, knowledge regarding our	mental states is grounded in	and	explained	by	one's	conscious	experience	of	those	same	states. Highlighting these points of agreement helps, I think, to target where	the	principle	disagreement	lies.	Whatever	similarities	may	be found	in	their	accounts	of	self-knowledge,	Ockham	and	Chatton	part ways	when it	comes to	explaining	what's required for	possession	of such	knowledge.	And,	as	I	say,	these	differences	amount	to	two	fundamentally	different	approaches	to	the	nature	of	consciousness.	Ockham	explains	consciousness	in	terms	of	higher-order	representation, whereas	Chatton	explains	it	in	terms	of	a	sui generis	mode	of	awareness that	is	neither	higher-order	nor	representational	in	nature.	Of	course, 48. Even	so,	it	seems	to	me	they	do	not	agree	about	what	Augustinian-style	selfknowledge is,	phenomenologically speaking.	While they	agree in thinking that	self-knowledge	is	a	kind	of	higher-order	belief	or	judgment,	they	would associate	such	judgments	with	different	types	of	conscious	phenomena.	This difference	will	emerge	more	clearly	below,	but	roughly	it	comes	to	this:	For Chatton,	the	presence	of	such	a	judgment	would	constitute	a	case	in	which one	is	explicitly	introspectively	attending	to	one's	own	states.	By	contrast,	on Ockham's	analysis,	such	a	judgment	merely	accompanies	one's	ordinary	conscious (world-directed) experience. Introspection	-	i. e., specifically attending	to	one's	own	states	-	would,	on	his	view,	be	a	third-order	phenomenon. 49. Thus, neither	Ockham	nor	Chatton should be understood as advancing a higher-order thought theory	of consciousness.	Although self-knowledge is, on	their	view,	a	matter	of	higher-order	thought,	it	isn't	the	fundamental	mode of	consciousness	of	one's	states.	Rather,	on	their	view	(as	will	become	clearer below),	consciousness	is	a necessary condition	for	self-knowledge. an	occurrent	thought	of	a	rock.	Chatton	changes	the	example	slightly, since, like	Ockham, he	wants to focus on cases in	which one possesses	knowledge	of	an intellective state.	Yet,	because	he	rejects the idea	that	perception	(i. e.,	intuition)	occurs	at	the	level	of	intellect,	he has	to	alter	the	case	accordingly.	(Now,	as	Chatton	alludes	in	the	foregoing	passage	and	as	I	indicate	in	the	diagram,	it	may	be	that,	in	order	to	think	about	a	rock,	one	must	have,	at	some	point,	an	intuitive cognition	of	a	rock	-	but	that	would	be	a	sensory	state,	not	intellective.)	The	second	thing	to	notice	is	that,	like	Ockham,	Chatton	takes self-knowledge	to	involve	assent	to	a	higher-order	propositional	representation	of	lower-order	states.	In	other	words,	it	takes	the	form	of a	higher-order	belief	or	judgment	about	those	states.	But	-	and	this is the	third	point	-	on	Chatton's	picture,	such	knowledge	regarding one's first-order states does not require higher-order perception of them.	For	a	subject	to	know	that	she's	thinking	about	a	rock,	it	is	necessary	that	she	be	thinking	about	a	rock,	but,	as	Chatton	says	in	the foregoing	passage,	"this	suffices	since	that	thought	is	suited	to	cause an	assent	with respect to itself	without the	mediation	of	any	act	of intuitive	cognition	of	it". Of	course,	the	most	pressing	question	for	Chatton	is	to	explain	how exactly the	occurrence	of	the	first-order	state	accounts	for	the	subject's knowledge	of	it.	The	answer	to	this	question, as	we'll	now	see,	turns on	Chatton's	views	about	the	nature	of	consciousness. Indeed,	what the	whole	of	the	foregoing	discussion	makes	clear,	I	think,	is	that	at the	heart	of	this	disagreement	about	reflexive	intellective	intuition	is	a question	about	the	proper	analysis	of	consciousness	itself.	It	is,	therefore,	to	the	accounts	of	consciousness	presupposed	by	Ockham's	and Chatton's	respective	analyses	of	self-knowledge	that	I	now	turn. 3. Consciousness: Higher-Order Intentionality vs. Same-Order Acquaintance As	we've	now	seen,	both	Ockham	and	Chatton	accept	the	same,	the broadly Augustinian, characterization of self-knowledge. What is susan	brower-toland Medieval Approaches to Consciousness: Ockham and Chatton philosophers'	imprint – 16 – vol.	12,	no.	17	(november	2012) turns	out to	be	an	extrinsic	property	of	conscious	states-something they	possesses	only	in	virtue	of	their	relation	to	other,	meta-intentional	states.	Nowadays,	proponents	of	HOR	theories	divide	according	to whether	they	take	the	consciousness-bestowing	state	to	be	perceptionlike or thought-like in	nature.	According to friends of "higher-order perception"	(HOP)	or	"inner-sense"	theories,	a	state	is	conscious	just in	case	it	is	the	object	of	some	kind	of	internal	monitoring	or	quasi-perceptual faculty.52	By	contrast, those	advocating for the "higher-order thought"	(HOT)	approach	hold	that	a	state	is	conscious	just	in	case	it	is the	object	of	an	assertoric	thought	to	the	effect	that	one	is	in	that	very state.53	On	both	approaches,	however,	consciousness	is	a	matter	of	the mind	directing	its	intentional	aim	upon	its	own	states	and	activities. That	Ockham's	conception	of	consciousness	fits	the	HOR	model	is,	I think,	fairly	clear.	As	we've	seen	from	his	discussion	of	self-knowledge, Ockham	argues	that it is the	presence	of	distinct,	higher-order	representations	-	namely, reflexive intellective intuitions	-	that accounts for	our	consciousness	of	and,	hence,	knowledge	regarding	our	(lowerorder)	subjective	states.54	In	this	respect,	he	appears	to	share	with	HOR theorists	the	view	that	the	distinction	between	conscious	and	unconscious	states	isn't	a	matter	of	some	difference	in	their	intrinsic	nature but	rather	a	matter	of	a	difference	in	the	relations	in	which	they	stand to	other	states.	Indeed,	Ockham	explicitly	says	as	much	in	another	context	-	one in which he is specifically considering whether reflexive 52. Leading defenders of higher-order perception theories include	Armstrong 1968	and	Lycan	1996,	2001,	2004.	It	may	also	have	been	the	view	of	Locke, Kant, and other early	modern inner-sense theorists	-	though recently the attribution	of this theory to	Locke	has	been	challenged.	See	Coventry	and Kriegel	2008. 53. Actually, higher-order thought theorists disagree about whether a given state	is	conscious	in	virtue	of	its	being	disposed	to	give	rise	to	a	higher-order thought or its being the	actual target of such a thought.	A	prominent proponent	of	actualist	higher-order	thought	theory	is	Rosenthal	(1986,	2005); the	dispositionalist	approach	is	defended	by	Carruthers	(1996).	For	a	useful survey of higher-order representationalist approaches in general, see	Carruthers	2007. 54. That	intuitive	cognitions	are	representational	states	is	something	I've	argued for	elsewhere.	See	Brower-Toland	2007. to	characterize	their	debate	in	this	way	is	to	frame	it	in	a	terminology that,	while familiar to contemporary discussions, is foreign to their own.	Certainly,	Ockham	and	Chatton	(and, to	my	knowledge,	medieval	philosophers in	general)	have	no	single	Latin	expression	corresponding to our own term "consciousness."50 Even so, the phenomenon	their	own	discussions target	clearly	does	share	a	great	deal in common	with	current	treatments	of	phenomenal	consciousness.	After all, at bottom, the issue at stake	between them is a question about the	proper	analysis	of	our	first-person	awareness	of	our	states.	In	particular,	Ockham	and	Chatton are interested in	what it is about conscious states that explains our awareness or experience	of being in them.	Given	this	way	of	characterizing	their	target	phenomenon,	it's quite	plausible	to	read	them	as	attempting	to	provide	a	theory	of	what, in	the	current	literature,	goes	under	the	name	"self-consciousness"	or "subjective	consciousness".51	What is	more, the type	of	position	each defends, and even the dialectical considerations that	motivate their respective development, approximates those staked out in the contemporary	debate-or	so	I	shall	now	argue. 3.1 Ockham: Consciousness as Higher-Order Perception According to what are referred to as "higher-order representation" (HOR)	theories	of	consciousness,	what	makes	a	given	state	conscious is	that	the	state	is	the	intentional	object	of,	or	represented	by,	another of	the	subject's	mental	states.	Thus,	on	HOR	theories,	consciousness 50.	Though	perhaps	their	usage	of	the	term	"experior"	captures	the	kind	of	phenomena	we	associate	with	conscious	experience.	For	a	discussion	of	the	history	and	etymology	of	the	contemporary	notion	of	"consciousness",	see	the introductory	essay	in	Heinämaa,	Läteenmäki,	and	Remes	2007. 51. See, for example, Kriegel 2009 and 2003. See also Zahavi 2005, Chapter 1. Like these contemporary theorists,	Ockham	and	Chatton (and	medieval philosophers in general) are primarily interested in the subjective or firstpersonal	dimension	of	phenomenal	consciousness.	Questions	about	qualitative character (the	what-it's-like aspect of conscious experience) figure far less	prominently in their	discussion.	For treatment	of	medieval theories	of consciousness in the latter sense, see King forthcoming(b), and Friedman forthcoming. susan	brower-toland Medieval Approaches to Consciousness: Ockham and Chatton philosophers'	imprint – 17 – vol.	12,	no.	17	(november	2012) Here	we	get	not	only a	picture	of	the	structure	of	self-knowledge	but also	a	sense	for	Ockham's	understanding	of	where	and	how	consciousness	occurs in it. In the	case represented, the	only state that	occurs consciously	is	the	first-order	intuition	of	the	rock	and	consciousness	of it	owes	to	a	distinct,	higher-order	state:	namely,	to	a	second-order,	perceptual	representation	of	it.	Clearly,	an	HOR	model	of	consciousness. There	can	be	little	doubt,	moreover,	about	which	variety	of	higher-order representationalism	Ockham endorses.	He holds that the conscious-making	state	is	an	act	of	reflexive	intuitive	cognition.	But since intuitive cognition is just a form of perceptual awareness, it should	be	clear	that	his	approach	also	falls	in	line	with	HOP	theories. Admittedly, on	Ockham's view, conscious states are such that they will	often	(if	not	always)	be	accompanied	by	higher-order	assertoric thoughts (i. e., by self-attributing beliefs).55 After all, he holds that acts	of	intuitive	cognition	(whether	direct	or	reflexive)	are	such	that they	naturally and immediately give rise to judgments about their object.	Even	so,	it	remains	true	that	such	higher-order	thoughts	are always psychologically (if not temporally) preceded	by perceptionlike	awareness	of	one's	states.56	Fundamentally,	then,	consciousness is,	for	him,	a	matter	of	higher-order	perception. As	it	turns	out,	moreover, the	kinds	of	considerations	that	lead	Ockham	to	his	view	are	very	similar	to	those	advanced	by	contemporary advocates	of	HOP	accounts	of	consciousness:	namely,	(i)	the	fact	that there	are	prima facie similarities	between	perceptual	experience	and conscious	experience,	(ii)	the	fact	that	HOP	models	can	easily	account for	the	difference	between	conscious	and	unconscious	states,	and,	finally,	(iii)	the	fact	that	HOP	models	can	do	so	without	introducing	any 55. Ockham	often	speaks	as	if	intuitive	cognitions	always	naturally	cause	acts	of judgment. I'm	assuming,	however, that,	since	he	also	holds	that	such	judgments involve	concepts	as	constituents, for subjects	who lack the relevant concepts	-	small children, say	-	an intuitive cognition	would	not generate full-fledged	perceptual	judgment. 56. In	general,	Ockham	holds that	acts	of	perceptual judgment (i. e., assertoric, propositional	thought)	are	always	preceded	by	acts	of	intuitive	awareness	of the	objects	of	such	judgments. awareness	of	one's	first-order	states	requires	the	introduction	of	a	further,	higher-order	state.	Here	he	asks	whether	a	subject	who	"has	only a	single	act	of	cognition	directed	at	some	[external]	object	...	is	aware of	thinking	of	that	object	or	not".	His	response	is	clearly	in	the	negative: If	we	accept	what	is	being	supposed	-	namely,	that	there is	only	a	single	act	of	cognition,	directed	at	some	object, then,	so	long	as	we	bracket	every	other	act	of	the	intellect, I	reply	that	no	[he	is	not	aware	that	he	is	thinking	of	that object].	Indeed,	I	claim	that	if	it	were	asked	of	him	at that very moment	whether	he is aware that	he is thinking	of that	object,	he	ought	not	agree	that	he	does	since,	at	that instant, he	does	not perceive that he is thinking	of the object.	(Quest in II Sent.	q.17	[OTh	V,	387–389]) On	Ockham's view, a first-order state that occurs in the absence of any	further	higher-order,	or	meta-intentional,	state	will,	for	the	same reason,	occur	unconsciously. In	light	of	the	foregoing,	we	can	adapt	our	earlier	diagram	of	Ockham's	account	of	self-knowledge	so	as	to	include	in	it	his	analysis	of consciousness	(which	is	indicated	by	the	"pow"	sign): Figure 5. Ockham's Account of Consciousness: susan	brower-toland Medieval Approaches to Consciousness: Ockham and Chatton philosophers'	imprint – 18 – vol.	12,	no.	17	(november	2012) ... there is	Augustine's example in	De Trinitate 9, at the end	of	chapter	8,	where	he	says that	often	he	has read [aloud] and yet not known	what	he	has read	or heard because	he	was	distracted	by	the	act	of	another	faculty... So, too, it frequently	happens	that	a	man	who	is intent on	seeing	does	not	perceive	that	he	is	hearing	something even though he is hearing it. (Quodl. 1.14 [OTh IX, 81] [trans.	Freddoso])60 The	difference	between	unconscious	and	conscious	states	is	easily	explained	on	the	higher-order	approach.61	Indeed,	as	Ockham	points	out here,	it's	merely	a	matter	of	whether	or	not	the	subject	"perceives"	his occurrent	states. Finally,	while	this	is	not	something	to	which	Ockham	himself	calls attention,	it	should	be	clear	that	there	are	considerations	of	theoretical,	or	explanatory,	simplicity	favoring	his	approach.	After	all,	a	HOP theory	of	consciousness	(or	any	theory	which	explains	consciousness in	terms	of	higher-order	intentionality)	is	reductionist	in	nature:	the strategy	is	to	explain	one	sort	of	mental	phenomenon	-	namely,	consciousness (or	at least	certain important features	of it)	-	in terms	of another	-	namely,	intentionality.62	In	Ockham's	case,	the	project	is	to explain both consciousness and the various phenomena associated with self-knowledge in terms of intellective intuitive cognition. For him, then, accounting for consciousness requires	nothing	beyond a 60.	This	point	is	made	in	response	to	an	objection	brought	against	his	view	by Chatton,	who,	as	we'll	see,	defends	a	one-level	approach. 61. Cf. Armstrong's well-known discussion of the "long-distance truck driver" case. 62.	Of	course,	as	I	indicated	above,	there	are	different	sorts	of	phenomena	that go under the heading "consciousness".	Higher-order theorists are divided over	whether higher-order intentionality accounts for both the subjective and	the	qualitative	aspects	of	conscious	experience.	Lycan	(2004),	for	example,	argues	that	his	HOP	theory	does	not	purport	to	explain	anything	about qualitative	character. mystery.57	Thus,	like	current	HOP	theorists,	Ockham	is	motivated,	in the	first	place,	by the simple	observation that there is	much in the phenomenology and epistemology of conscious experience which seems	akin	to	that	of	ordinary	perception.	Our	awareness	of	our	own states,	like	our	perceptual	awareness	of	extra-mental	objects,	is	utterly immediate.	Indeed,	the	phenomenology	of	consciousness	is	as	of	our states	being	immediately	present	to	us	-	much	as	intuitive	cognition of	some	object	makes it	present	to	us.58	Similarly,	our	awareness	of our	subjective	states	is	such	that	it	both	immediately	gives	rise	to	and non-inferentially	justifies	beliefs	about	them	-	thus	consciousness	of our states seems to function in	much the	way the	ordinary	perceptual awareness functions vis-à-vis perceptual belief. It	would seem, therefore,	that	the	weight	of	everyday	experience	(and,	on	Ockham's view,	authority59)	favors	an	inner-sense,	or	inner-perception,	theory of	consciousness. Again, like contemporary defenders of higher-order approaches, Ockham cites in favor of his view the fact that his theory provides means for explaining the difference between conscious and unconscious	states.	And	since	both	experience	and	authority	make	clear	that not	all	occurrent	states	are	conscious,	he	takes	this	to	be	no	small	advantage	for	his	view.	As	he	points	out: 57. Lycan	2004	provides	a	useful	overview	of	the	motivations	favoring	higher-order	perception	theories.	His	discussion	focuses	primarily	on	the	advantages of	a	higher-order	perception	approach	over	a	higher-order	thought	approach, but	the	considerations	he	advances	usefully	highlight	the	motivations	for	the approach	generally.	See	also	Kriegel	2006	and	Carruthers	2007 for further discussion	of	considerations	favoring	(and	weighing	against)	HOP	theories (and	HOR	theories	in	general). 58.	Like	Scotus,	Ockham	holds	that	one	of	the	distinguishing	features	of	intuitive states	in	general	is	that	they	make	their	objects	experientially	present	to	us. 59.	As	Ockham	is	well	aware,	Augustine	himself	markedly	prefers	to	characterize	consciousness	using	perceptual	(indeed,	primarily,	visual)	metaphors.	Indeed,	as	we've	seen,	he	calls	special	attention	to	precisely	those	passages	in which	Augustine	explains	self-knowledge	in	terms	of	inner-vision.	See	notes 22–23	above. susan	brower-toland Medieval Approaches to Consciousness: Ockham and Chatton philosophers'	imprint – 19 – vol.	12,	no.	17	(november	2012) knowledge.66	Finally,	there	are	those	who	take	issue	with	HOR	theories on grounds having to do	with their explanatory adequacy	-	or lack	thereof.	That	is	to	say,	those	who	oppose	HOR	theories	often	do so	because they	hold that such theories leave the	distinctively firstpersonal	character	of	conscious	experience	wholly	unexplained.67	As we'll	now	see,	Chatton's	account	of	consciousness	is	motivated	by	precisely	this	sort	of	concern. 3.2 Chatton: Consciousness as Same-Order Subjectivity What	we've	seen	of	Chatton's	account	of	self-knowledge	makes	clear that	he	not	only	rejects	Ockham's	higher-order	perception	model	of consciousness but also advocates some kind of one-level, or sameorder,	theory.	What	is	less	clear,	though,	is	exactly	how	we	are	to	understand	his	alternative	proposal. If	awareness	of	one's	states isn't	a function	of	higher-order	representation	of	them,	what	does	render	a given	state	conscious? One	way	to	respond	to	this	question	-	an	approach	frequently	taken	by	contemporary	advocates	of	one-level	theories	-	is	to	argue	that conscious	states	are	self-representing:	that	is,	they	represent	both	the world	and	themselves	(i. e.,	their	own	occurrence).68	According	to	such theories,	consciousness	is	a	function	of	same-order	self-representation. 66.	This	line	of	objection	is	widely	discussed	in	the	contemporary	literature.	Discussions	include	Byrne	1997,	Neander	1998,	and	Kriegel	2003b. 67.	This	sort	of	objection	has	been	formulated	variously	by	various	people.	Rudder	Baker	(1998,	2000),	to	take	one	example,	has	recently	argued	that	naturalist approaches to consciousness, such	as	HOR theories,	presuppose	but also	fail	to	explain	the	first-person	perspective.	In	a	similar	vein,	Kriegel	(e. g., 2003a)	argues	for	the	superiority	of	a	same-order	representational	approach, on	the	grounds	that	HOR	theories	fail	to	adequately	explain	the	subjective character	of	conscious	states.	This same line	of	criticism is	also	prominent in the	phenomenological tradition.	Phenomenologists	such	as	Husserl	and Sartre have traditionally argued against both higher-order and representationalist approaches to consciousness precisely on the grounds that such approaches	fail to	account	for	the	phenomenon	of	subjective,	pre-reflexive awareness.	See	Zahavi	2005	and	Gallagher	and	Zahavi	2005. 68.	Current proponents of such a view include	Uriah	Kriegel and	Robert	Van Gulick.	See	Kriegel	2009	and	Kriegel	and	Williford	2006. higher-order	iteration	of	his	general	theory	of	perception.63	Although Ockham	himself	doesn't	cite	theoretical	simplicity	as	a	consideration in	favor	of	the	theory,	some	of	his	successors	did	call	attention	to	the fact that an approach such as Chatton's introduces mystery where Ockham's	does	not.64 To	the	extent	that	Ockham's	account	shares	the	advantages	of	HOR theories	of	consciousness,	it	is	likewise	subject	to	the	same	sorts	of	objections	traditionally	brought	against	such	theories.	Indeed,	a	number of	the	objections	Chatton	presses	against	Ockham	persist	even	in	current	discussions	of	higher-order theories.	For	example, like	Chatton, critics of higher-order theories frequently object that this approach threatens	an	infinite	regress	in	higher-order	states.65	Again,	such	critics	-	like	Chatton	-	often	call	attention	to	fact	that	HOR	theories	allow for	the	possibility	of	non-veridical	self-awareness-a	possibility	which seems	incompatible	with	the	apparent	security	and	immediacy	of	self63.	Unlike	that	of	most	contemporary	higher-order	intentionality	theorists,	however,	Ockham's reductionism isn't	motivated	by	physicalist	or	naturalist inclinations.	Although	he	certainly	means	to	explain	consciousness	in	terms	of the	purely	representational	features	of	mental	states,	there	is	no	program	to further	reduce	these	latter	features	to	non-mental	properties	or	relations. 64.	Although,	as indicated in the	previous	note,	medieval	philosophers	do	not share	the	kind	of	materialist	outlook	that	motivates	current	reductionist	accounts	of	consciousness,	it	is	not	immediately	obvious	how	(or	where)	consciousness	-	if	taken	as	primitive	-	fits	within	their	own	metaphysical	paradigm.	Wodeham	points	this	out	in	his	reaction	to	Chatton's	account.	See	note 83	below. 65.	Although I passed	over the	details of	Chatton's formulation	of this line	of objection, the	general	direction	of reasoning	goes	something like this: If	a second-order state confers consciousness on a given first-order state, the second-order state	must itself be conscious.	Hence, there	must be a thirdorder	state,	and	so	on.	One	finds,	in	the	current	(and	even	in	the	medieval) literature,	a	host	of	different	ways	of	formulating	this	sort	of	argument	-	different	formulations	having	to	do	with	(a)	the	particular	version	of	HOR	being targeted and (b) how the opening	premise is	motivated. See, for example, Rowlands	2001	(for	a	regress	argument	targeted	specifically	at	HOT	theories), Kriegel	2003a	(111	ff.),	and	Zahavi	2005	(25ff.).	As	it	turns	out,	Ockham	is	no more	moved	by	the	charge	of	regress	than	contemporary	proponents	of	HOP approaches	typically	are.	The	standard	contemporary	reply	is	simply	to	reject its	guiding	assumption.	Ockham's	response	is	much	the	same.	I	discuss	Chatton's	regress	charge	and	Ockham's	response	to	it	in	detail	elsewhere. susan	brower-toland Medieval Approaches to Consciousness: Ockham and Chatton philosophers'	imprint – 20 – vol.	12,	no.	17	(november	2012) thinking	-	does	not	exist	except	as	an	act	received	[in	the mind].	But	from	the	fact	that	the	mind	receives	that	act, one	is	not	entitled	(contingit)	to	conclude	that	that	act	is its	own	object.	Therefore,	etc.	(Reportatio et Lectura super Sent. Prol. q.1, a.1, 26) This	passage	opens	with	Chatton	reiterating	his	claim	that	the	mere occurrence	of a	given	mental act	or state is sufficient for subjective awareness	of it.	On	his	view, there is	no	need for	any further	act	of cognition.	The	subject,	he	insists,	"experiences"	his	act	"without	any cognition	of	it".	And,	as	subsequent	remarks	make	clear,	this	is	meant to	rule	out	not	only	cognition	of	the	act	by	a	distinct	and	higher-order state	but	cognition	and	hence representation	of	any	kind	-	including same-order	self-representation.	As	he	says, "[F]rom	the fact that the mind	receives"	(and,	I	would	add	here,	experiences)	"its	own	act,	one	is not	entitled	to	conclude	that	that	act	is	its	own	object".72 Although	Chatton's	remarks	in	this	passage	don't	exactly	amount to	an	argument	against	the	SOR	approach,	the	specific	case	he	considers	-	namely,	a	conscious	act	of	desire/love	-	does	provide	prima facie, intuitive	grounds	for	rejecting	it.	After	all,	Chatton's	claim	here	is	that whenever	someone	occupies	a	conative	state	(i. e.,	an	act	of	desire	or volition)	he	will	-	absent	any	other	mental	act	-	experience	himself as	being	in	that	state.	This	much	Chatton	takes	as	intuitive.	To	grant him	just	this,	however,	is	to	grant	all	he	thinks	he	needs	for	his	case against	a	SOR	theory	of	consciousness.	And	this	is	because,	on	Chatton's view	-	as on that of	many	medieval thinkers	-	conative states such	as	loving	or	desiring	are	non-representational	in	nature.73	Hence, 72. Elsewhere,	Chatton is even	more explicit: "I say that a direct and a reflexive	act	are	never	the	same	properly	speaking,	since	an	external	rock	and	the thought	of	it	in	the	soul	are	distinct	things,	therefore	also	thoughts	properly of	it	are	distinct.	As	a	result,	the	thought	by	which	an	external	rock	is	thought of is one thing and the thought	by	which the thought	of the rock is itself thought	of	is	another."	(Reportatio et Lectura super Sent.	Prol.	q.2,	a.5,	125–126) 73. Chatton	holds	that	the	intellect	and	will	are	not	really	distinct	(but	only	formally).	Nevertheless,	he	holds	that,	although	acts	of	willing	and	refusing	(and As	with	higher-order	theories,	on	the	self-representational	account,	a state	is	conscious	just	in	case	it	is	represented	in	the	relevant	way; 69 but	unlike	higher-order	representationalist	accounts,	on	this	view,	the representing	state	and	the	represented	state	are	numerically	one	and the	same.	In	order	to	distinguish	this	approach	from	higher-order	representationalism	(where	the	latter	is	understood	as	a	two-level	theory), I	shall	refer	to	it	as	"Same-Order	Representationalism"	or	"SOR". This	sort	of	approach	has	gained	currency	in	contemporary	discussions	of	consciousness	and	has	been	associated	with	historical	figures ranging from	Aristotle to Locke and Brentano.70 It is,	moreover, an approach	countenanced	by	some	medieval	thinkers.	Indeed,	Chatton himself	explicitly	considers this	sort	of	view	-	but	only	to	reject it.71 Consider	his	remarks	in	the	following	passage.	Here	Chatton	is	focusing	on	the	case	of	a	conscious	desire	(or	"act	of	love"): Barring any experiential cognition relating to love, and allowing	only	this,	viz.	that	an	[act	of]	love	is	received	in the	mind:	in	such	a	case,	one	will	experience	oneself	to love.	In	much	the	same	way,	one	experiences	oneself	to think	of	a	rock	when	one	has	that	act	-	here	too,	barring any	experiential	awareness	of	that	act	of	thinking.	It	is	the case,	therefore,	that	if	anyone	has	a	proximate	act	of	loving	without	any	cognition	of	that	proximate	act,	nevertheless,	one	will	experience	that	act	of loving,	without	any cognition	of it. I	confirm	this in the	second	place,	since that	which is	experienced	-	namely	the	act	of loving	or 69.	What	is	more,	self-representing	states	are	like	higher-order	states	in	that	they are	reflexive	(in	Ockham's	sense)	and,	hence,	possess	higher-order	content. 70.	See	Caston	2002	for	a	discussion	of this	view	in	connection	with	Aristotle and	Kriegel	2003a	for	its	connection	to	Brentano;	see	Coventry	and	Kriegel 2008	for	an	attribution	of	the	view	to	Locke. 71. Interestingly,	Ockham,	too,	considers	and	rejects	this	sort	of	approach.	As	it turns	out,	there	was	a	good	deal	of	debate	about	the	possibility	of	same-order representation	among	late	medieval	thinkers.	I	sketch	the	outlines	of	this	debate	and	situate	it	vis-à-vis	broader	medieval	debates	about	consciousness	in Brower-Toland	forthcoming(b). susan	brower-toland Medieval Approaches to Consciousness: Ockham and Chatton philosophers'	imprint – 21 – vol.	12,	no.	17	(november	2012) experiences something as an act and not as an object does	not	require	such	an	intuition.	This	is	because	to	be experienced	in	this	way	there	need	be	only	a	living	subject	receiving	its	own	act.	(Reportatio et Lectura super Sent. Prol.	q.2,	a.5,	120–1) In	the	opening	lines	of	this	passage,	Chatton	identifies	what	he	takes to	be	two	fundamentally	different	types	or	modes	of	awareness:	namely,	the	way	in	which	we	are	aware	of	objects	and	the	way	in	which	we are	aware	of	our	subjective	states.74	After	noting this	distinction,	he goes	on	to	argue	that	failure	to	mark	it	will	yield	an	infinite	regress	in higher-order states.	Before considering that argument,	however,	we need	to	be	clearer	about	the	nature	of	the	distinction	itself. "The mind," Chatton says, "experiences something in a two-fold way"	-	namely,	"it	experiences	something	as	an	object	and	...	as	a	living	subject	experiences	its	own	act".	The	idea	seems	to	be	this:	In	any given	conscious	experience-conscious	perception	of	a	rock,	say	-	one can	identify	two	phenomenally	distinct	elements.	There	is	(a)	the	subject's awareness	of the	object of the	perception, and there is (b) the subject's	awareness	of	her	perceiving it	-	that	is,	subjective	awareness of	herself	having	such	a	perception.75	Chatton	certainly	does	think	that that	first,	outward-directed	aspect	of	conscious	experience is	a func74.	Cf. ibid., 126, where Chatton puts the same distinction this way: "[T]he mind	receives	the	thought	of	the	stone	and	experiences	that	thought,	not as	a	power	experiences	its	object	but	as	a	power	experiences	its	own	act	in receiving	it". 75. Similar distinctions are often drawn in contemporary discussions. See, for example, McGinn 1991, which describes conscious experience as "Janusfaced"	(34)	-	having	an	"outward-looking	face"	(namely,	directedness	toward an object) and an "inward-looking face" (namely, its "presence to the subject").	Again,	see	Kriegel	2009	(7–11).	In	the	phenomenological	tradition,	the same	distinction	is	often	put	in	terms	closer	to	those	Chatton	himself	uses	in the foregoing	passage	-	namely,	as	one	between	object-consciousness	and self-consciousness.	Zahavi	(2005)	puts	it	this	way:	"It	makes	perfect	sense	to speak	of	self-consciousness	whenever	I	am	not	simply	conscious	of	an	external	object	-	a	chair,	a	chestnut	tree,	or	a	rising	sun	-	but	acquainted	with	my experience	of	the	object	as	well,	for	in	such	a	case	my	consciousness	reveals itself	to	me.	Thus	the	basic	distinction	to	be	made	is	the	distinction	between the	subject's	awareness	of	his	desire	(or	"love")	cannot	be	explained	in terms	of	that	state's	representing	itself. Whatever	we	might think	about the	plausibility	of this	particular example,	it	highlights	what	I	take	to	be	the	heart	of	Chatton's	own,	alternative	approach.	On	his	view,	consciousness	is	not	only	an intrinsic but	also	a	non-representational	feature	of	those	states	which	possess	it. Indeed,	it is	this	latter	aspect	of	Chatton's	account	that	most	sharply distinguishes	it	from	Ockham's.	What	Chatton	wants	to	resist	in	Ockham's theory is not	merely the appeal to	higher-order representation but	also	-	and,	I	think,	most	importantly	-	to	intentionality	in general as	an	explanation	for	consciousness.	That	this	is	the	case	becomes	all the	more	clear	when	we	turn	to	his	own,	positive	characterization	of the	nature	of	conscious	experience. Take,	for	example,	his	remarks	in	the	following	text: The	mind	experiences	something	in	a	two-fold	way.	This is because it experiences something as an object, and then	something	is	experienced	as	a	living	subject	experiences	its	own	act.	Otherwise,	it	would	go	on	to	infinity, since	if	its	act	were	experienced	only	as	an	object,	there would therefore	be there	another	of	which it is the	object,	and	it	would	be	experienced.	Either,	therefore,	it	is experienced	as	an	act	is	and	not	as	the	object	-	and	we have	our	case	-	or	just	as	an	object	through	another	act and so to infinity. Therefore, although the experience by	which the soul experiences something as an object may	require	intuitive	cognition	(in	which	case,	the	soul experiences	nothing in this	way	during this life except by	sensation),	nevertheless, the	experience	by	which it also acts of intellective assent and	dissent) are states that depend	on and accompany propositional representations, they are not themselves representational	states.	(This	is	not	to	say,	of	course,	that	they	are	not	intentional states	in	the	broad	sense	indicated	in	note	4	above.)	For	further	discussion	of Chatton's	discussion	of	the	nature	of	assent	and	dissent,	see	Brower-Toland forthcoming(a). susan	brower-toland Medieval Approaches to Consciousness: Ockham and Chatton philosophers'	imprint – 22 – vol.	12,	no.	17	(november	2012) 4.	But	M*	occurs	consciously	only if	S	experiences	her	having	M*. 5.	S's	experiencing	M*	in	this	way	owes	either	to	(iii)	the	occurrence of	M* itself or (iv) the occurrence of some act, M**,	which	is	distinct	from	M*	and	takes	M*	as	object. 6.	If	(iv),	M**	must	occur	consciously. And	so	on... 7. If one's experience	of having a state owes to that state's being	the	object	of	a	state	distinct	from	it,	there	will	be	a vicious	infinite	regress	in	mental	states. The first premise captures Chatton's contention that a conscious state	-	call	it	M	-	is	such	that	its	subject	is	aware	of	her	having	it	or being	in	it.	(Or,	in	Chatton's	phrasing,	it	is	such	that	it	"is experienced as a living subject experiences its own act".)	The	second	premise	then goes	on	to	note	two	ways	of	accounting	for	such	experience:	either	by appeal	to	some	feature	of	the	occurrence	of	M	itself	or	by	appeal	to	the fact	that	M	serves	as	the	object	for	a	distinct,	higher-order	mental	state, M*.	So	far,	so	good.	The	crux,	of	course,	comes	at	premise	3.	The	basic claim	here	is	that	if	a	subject's	awareness	of	being	in	M	owes	to	M's serving	as	the	object	of	some	higher-order	state,	M*,	it	must	be	that that	M*	occurs	consciously.	And,	if	this	is	right,	we'll	get	our	regress (as the remaining	premises show).	The	obvious	question:	Why suppose	premise	3	is	true? Chatton's	argument isn't	motivated	by	a failure to	appreciate the possibility	that	some	states	can occur	non-consciously	(as,	historically, many	regress	arguments	against	higher-order	approaches	have	been). Rather,	the	motivation	is	the	assumption	that	if	the	second-order	state, M*, isn't	conscious,	then	its	occurrence	fails	to	explain	the	phenomenon	in	question,	namely,	S's	awareness	of	her	having	or	being in	the first-order	state,	M.	We	might,	then,	flesh	out	the	support	for	premise 3	this	way: tion	of	the	intentional	or,	more	specifically,	the	representational	structure	of	our	mental	states.	Indeed,	he	shares	Ockham's	views	about	the representational	nature	of	thought	and	perception	broadly	speaking. What	Chatton	wants	to	resist,	however,	is	the	notion	that	latter,	inner or	subjective	aspect	of	conscious	experience	can	be	explained	in	terms of intentionality	-	in particular, in terms	of higher-order representation.	Thus,	whereas	Ockham	holds	that	a	state's	being	conscious	is	a matter	of	its	subject	being	conscious	of it	(via an	act	higher-order	intuition),	Chatton	insists	that	awareness	of	one's	states	is	merely	a	matter of	"a	living	subject	receiving	its	own	act". The argument for taking subjective awareness of one's states as irreducibly	distinct from	higher-order awareness	of it comes	on the heels	of	the	distinction	itself.	Here	is	the	relevant	bit	of	the	passage: ...	if	[the	mind's	first-order]	act	were	experienced	only	as an object, there would, therefore, be, at that point, another [second-order act] of which it is the object, and that	one	[namely,	the	second-order	act]	would	be	experienced.	But	either	it	is	experienced	as	an	act	and	not	as	an object	-	and	we	have	our	case	-	or	as	an	object	through another	act	and	so	to	infinity.	(Reportatio et Lectura super Sent.	Prol.	q.2,	a.5,	120–1) To	be	sure,	the	argument	is	highly	compressed.	But	I	think	it	may	be fairly	reconstructed	as	follows: 1.	A	mental	state,	M,	of	a	subject,	S,	occurs	consciously	only	if S	experiences	her	having	M. 2.	S's	experiencing	M	in	this	way	owes	either	to	(i)	the	occurrence	of	M	itself	or	(ii)	the	occurrence	of	some	further	state, M*,	which	is	distinct	from	M	and	takes	M	as	its	object. 3.	If	(ii),	M*	must	occur	consciously. the	case	where	an	object	is	given	(object-consciousness)	and	cases	wherein consciousness	itself	is	given	to	me	(self-consciousness)."	(15) susan	brower-toland Medieval Approaches to Consciousness: Ockham and Chatton philosophers'	imprint – 23 – vol.	12,	no.	17	(november	2012) its	subject,	then	premise	3	(in	my	reconstruction)	is	justified.	And,	as we've seen, that's all	Chatton	needs to generate the regress. For, in that	case, the fact that	M* is	conscious	requires	explanation.	And if we	try	to explain	this	by	appeal	to	a	distinct,	third-order	state	(namely, M**),	we'll	be	off	and	running	on	an	infinite	regress,	since	that	state, too,	must, for	all the	same	reasons,	occur	consciously,	and	so	on ad infinitum.	The	regress	is	clearly	vicious,	moreover,	since	at	no	point	do we	arrive	at	an	explanation	of	the	target	phenomenon	-	namely,	the distinctively first-personal experience of our subjective states. Now, whether	Chatton's	argument	is	ultimately	successful	against	Ockham is,	of	course,	a	further	question.	And	it's	not	one	I	mean	to	take	up	here. My	aim	in	all	this	has	been,	rather,	just	to	clarify	the	nature	of	the	argument	itself	in	order	to	see	what	light	it	sheds	on	Chatton's	own	account of	consciousness. A	final	point	about	the	argument	itself:	While	specifically	targeted at	Ockham	and, so, at a	higher-order representationalist account	of consciousness,	the	regress	argument	makes	clear	why	Chatton	would be	no	more	inclined	to	accept	a	same-order,	or	self-representational, approach	-	or, for that matter, any intentionalist approach to consciousness. After all, what characterizes ordinary intentional awareness	is,	we	might	say,	a	kind	of	object-directedness.	Intentional	states are	such	that	they	are	about	or	directed	at	something	(and	this is	so whether	we take their intentionality as a function	of their representational	structure	or	as	some	more	direct,	non-representational	mode of acquaintance).	The thrust of	Chatton's regress argument, as I understand	it,	is	just	to	show	that	the	subjective	character	of	conscious experience	cannot	be	explained	by	appeal	to	this	sort	object-directed awareness.	The	argument	itself,	therefore,	entails	that	consciousness is	a	sui generis form	of	awareness:	a	kind	of	same-order	subjectivity	that uniquely	characterizes	the	nature	of	our	access	to	our	occurrent	states. One	significant	consequence	of	all this is	that,	on Chatton's	view, consciousness	turns	out	to	be	not	only	sui generis	but	also	ubiquitous. If	one's	merely	"receiving"	or	undergoing	a	given	act	is	sufficient	for consciousness	of	it,	then	every	state	will	occur	consciously.	There	are 3a.	If	(ii),	M*	must	occur	either	consciously	or	not. 3b.	If	M*	occurs non-consciously,	then	its	occurrence	fails	to	explain	the	fact	that	S	experiences	her	having	M. 3c.	If	(ii),	M*	must	occur	consciously. Of	course,	this	just	pushes	the	question	back	a	step.	Now	we	want	to know	why	we	should	think	that,	for	the	subject	to	experience	her	having	M,	she	must	also	experience	herself	having	the	higher-order	state, M*,	which	takes	M	as	object. Here, I think	Chatton's answer comes to this: If	M* is a	non-conscious representation	of	M,	then	the	nature	of	S's	awareness	of	M	will turn	out	to	be	analogous	to	an ordinary,	third-person	awareness	of	an object.	Thus,	just	as	M	-	say	it's	a	perception	of	a	rock	-	yields	awareness	of	the	rock's	existence	or	presence,	so	too	M*	(if it	occurs	nonconsciously)	will	merely	make	S	aware	of	M's	presence	or	occurrence. But,	arguably,	S's	being	aware	of	the	occurrence	of	M	isn't	the	same	as her	subjectively	experiencing	her	having it (i. e.,	experiencing	herself being in	it	or	undergoing	it).	And	this	is	because,	as	Chatton	insists,	in such	a	scenario,	M	would	"only	be	experienced	as	an	object"	and	not in	the	way	that	"a	living	subject	experiences	its	own	act".	But,	of	course, it	is	the	latter	phenomenon	we're	trying	to	explain.	What's	needed,	as Chatton	sees	it,	is	mode	of	awareness	adequate	to	ground	first-person, self-attributing beliefs; it's not at all clear, however, that	merely being	aware	of	the	occurrence	of	some	state	is	sufficient	for	first-person knowledge	that	I	occupy	or	am	the	subject	of	such	a	state.76	On	the contrary,	Chatton	thinks,	just	the	opposite	is	the	case. In	the	end,	therefore,	Chatton	thinks	he	has	his	regress.	For	if	the phenomenon	in	question	requires	that	the	subject	is	aware	not	only of	the	occurrence	of	some	mental	state	or	event	but	also	of	her	being 76. If,	however, the	higher-order	representation	of	M	is	one	S	experiences	herself	as	undergoing,	S will	not	be	merely (transitively)	aware	of	M, she	will also	experience	her	awareness	of it.	And this,	Chatton	seems to	allow,	does account	for	the	(first-order)	phenomenon	in	question,	but	then	we	must	explain	awareness	of	M*. susan	brower-toland Medieval Approaches to Consciousness: Ockham and Chatton philosophers'	imprint – 24 – vol.	12,	no.	17	(november	2012) he	is	not	caused	to	assent	to	the	thing	signified	by	it.	As a	result,	he	does	not	assent	that	he	is	thinking	[of	a	rock]. And	this	is	because	perceiving	that	he	thinks	(or	assenting that	he	thinks)	is	an	assent	caused	both	by	[the	first-order] thought	of	the	rock	and	the	entertaining	of	a	[higher-order] propositional	representation.	[But	the	propositional	representation is] formed	without any intuitive vision	of that thought of the rock, since the thoughts from	which the proposition 'I	am	thinking	of	a	rock' is	composed	are	abstractive.	(Reportatio et Lectura super Sent.	Prol.	q.2,	a.5,	125) The	case itself is	one in	which	a	subject is,	we	might	say, inattentively	aware	of	some	object.	This	example	represents,	I	take	it,	the	more mundane, non-reflective awareness that Chatton thinks constitutes ordinary	conscious	experience.	It	is	to	be	contrasted,	moreover,	with the	kind	of	explicit	or	attentive	self-awareness	that	characterizes	selfknowledge	(i. e.,	that	comes	with	the	forming	of	self-attributing	beliefs). What the passage suggests, then, is that while ordinary conscious states	may	possess	a	kind	of	subjective	character	-	that is,	a	kind	of implicit,	experiential	awareness	of	one's	being	in	that	state	-	they	are not, in the	ordinary	case, states	of	which the subject is	explicitly	or focally	aware. If this is	right,	however, it	goes	some	distance	toward alleviating	the	worry	about	ubiquity.	To	say	that	all	states	occur	consciously does not entail (and, indeed, is to be contrasted	with) any explicit self-knowledge regarding such states. Indeed, it is perfectly consistent	with	Chatton's	view	to	say	that	a	state	can	occur	consciously and	yet	its	subject	fail	to	notice	or	attend	to	it. This	distinction	between	ordinary	consciousness	and	introspective self-knowledge	makes	clear	that	certain	refinements	are	called	for	in my earlier characterization of Chatton's account of self-knowledge. Recall that	on the	picture I initially	offered	of	Chatton's account (cf. Figure	4	above),	it	appeared	that,	for	him	as	for	Ockham,	the	mere	occurrence	of	a	first-order	state	is	sufficient	for	self-knowledge	regarding two	reasons	for	noting	this	implication	of	Chatton's	account.	First,	because	it	looks	to	be	a	liability	for	it.77	Indeed,	on	this	score,	common sense	(or	everyday	experience)	appears	to	line	up	with	Ockham	-	and with	HOR theories	more generally, since such views accommodate the	(seemingly	uncontroversial)	fact	that	we	are	not	always	aware	of our	occurrent	states.	Chatton	himself	seems	to	be	aware	of	this	worry for	his	account	and	makes	some	attempt	to	address it.	This leads	to the	second	reason	for	noting	Chatton's	commitment	to	the	ubiquity	of consciousness.	In	the	course	of	trying	to	explain	how	it	is	that	we	can seem	not	to	be	aware	of	some	of	our	states,	Chatton	introduces	an	important	refinement	on	his	account	of	self-knowledge	-	one	to	which	I alluded	earlier.	In	order	to	complete	our	picture	of	Chatton's	account of	consciousness	and	self-knowledge,	therefore,	I	want	to	briefly	consider	his	response	to	the	worry	about	ubiquity. Although	Chatton	holds	that	all	occurrent	states	occur	consciously, he	nevertheless	allows	that	there	are	different	degrees	or	levels	of	consciousness.	Consider	the	following	case: ...	someone	can	see	something	via the	senses	and,	nevertheless,	at	the	moment	he	sees	it,	does	not	attend	(advertit) to	himself	seeing.	But,	after	the	vision,	by	a	certain	trace [left in	the	memory],	when	he	attends,	he	perceives	that he	saw.	I	confirm	this	because	someone	can	be	thinking	of a	rock	and	still	not	entertain	this	proposition:	'I	am	thinking	of	a	rock'.	And	if	he	does	not	entertain	that	proposition, 77. Chatton's	own	contemporaries	call	attention	to	this	consequence	as	a	cost	of Chatton's	view.	Consider	Wodeham's	remarks	on	this	score:	"It	is	one	thing to	experience	an	object	and	another	[to	experience]	the	act	itself.	...	if	[the soul]	did	[experience	its	own	act],	then	it	would	be	not	be	possible	for	a	living	principle	to	receive	its	own	act	without	it	being	the	case	that	one	experience	that	act.	But	this	is	false,	since	a	person	can	see	and,	nevertheless,	not experience	that	he	sees.	...	Here's	the	proof:	as	blessed	Augustine	says	in	De Trinitate	XI.8,	and	as	is	certainly	true,	whenever	we	are	walking	along	-	over	a bridge,	say	-	we	see	it	but	do	not	register	that	we	see.	The	reason	for	this,	he supposes,	is	that	we	do	not	perceive,	while	we	are	seeing,	that	we	are	seeing. But	we	do,	nevertheless,	see.	For	if	we	did	not,	we	would,	as	Augustine	says, grope	around	as	if in	the	dark."	(Lectura Secunda in Librum Primum Sententiarum,	Prol.	q.2	[I,	58–59]) susan	brower-toland Medieval Approaches to Consciousness: Ockham and Chatton philosophers'	imprint – 25 – vol.	12,	no.	17	(november	2012) As	Figure	6	makes	clear,	the	ubiquity	of	ordinary	consciousness	does not	entail	the	ubiquity	of	self-knowledge	(or	introspective	awareness). Indeed,	the	latter	is	much	rarer,	since,	after	all,	we	rarely	take	our	own states as	objects	of attention	or	observation.	Thus,	while	we	experience	all	of	our	states,	we	are,	on	Chatton's	view,	introspectively	aware of	relatively	few. 4. Conclusion: Ockham, Chatton, and Medieval Approaches to Consciousness Although framed in the context of a dispute about a technical	matter	-	namely, the existence reflexive, intellective, intuitive cognition	-	the	issue	at	stake	in	the	debate	between	Ockham	and	Chatton is	both familiar and longstanding.	At	bottom, it is the issue	of	how best to explain consciousness	-	more specifically, our seemingly direct,	experiential	awareness	of	our	own	(occurrent)	mental	states.	The way	in	which	Ockham	and	Chatton	approach	this	question	not	only illuminates	medieval	approaches	to	consciousness	more	generally	but, as	I	have	argued,	also	shares	much	in	common	with	current	treatments of	selfor	subjective	consciousness. As	the	debate	between	Ockham	and	Chatton	also	illustrates,	medieval	discussions	of	consciousness	develop	against the	backdrop of	Augustine's	theory	of	self-knowledge.	Because	self-knowledge	is at	the	heart	of	Augustine's	widely	accepted	account	of	the	mind	as the	imago Dei,	his	views	about	the	nature	of	such	knowledge	come to figure among the basic explananda in cognitive theory. For the same reason, questions about consciousness and self-knowledge very often arise in connection with discussions about the nature and mechanisms of cognition. In this regard, too, therefore, the debate	between	Ockham	and	Chatton	is	perfectly	representative.78 What	is	more,	the	specific	issue	about	whether	or	not	awareness	of 78.	Whereas,	in	Ockham	and	Chatton's	case,	the	issue	arises	in	connection	with debates	about	the	nature	of	intuitive	cognition,	among	earlier	figures,	such	as Aquinas	and	his	contemporaries,	it	arises	in	connection	with	debates	about species-theories	of	cognition.	In	particular,	it	often	arises	in	connection	with debates	about	intelligible	species	and	the	role	they	play	in	self-knowledge. that	state.	It	should	now	be	clear,	however,	that	this	is	not,	in	fact,	the case.	For,	as	Chatton	insists	in	the	foregoing	passage: someone	can	think	of	a	rock	and,	nevertheless,	not	entertain	this	proposition:	'I	am	thinking	of	a	rock'	...	but	perceiving	that	he	thinks	(or	assenting	that	he	thinks)	is	an assent	caused	both	by	the	[first-order]	thought	of	the	rock and	by	means	of	a	[higher-order]	propositional	representation.	(Reportatio et Lectura super Sent.	Prol.	q.2,	a.5,	125) On Chatton's view, therefore, self-knowledge requires not only the conscious	occurrence	of,	but	also	the	subject's	explicit	attention	to,	her first-order	state.	And,	apparently,	attending	to	one's	first-order	states involves one's entertaining some higher-order thought about it. In light	of these	refinements,	we	are	now	in	a	position	to	offer	a	more complete	picture	of	Chatton's	account	of	self-knowledge	-	one	which reflects	his	distinction	between	consciousness	(indicated	by	the	"pow" sign) on the	one	hand and the sort of introspective awareness that constitutes	self-knowledge	on	the	other: Figure 6. Chatton on the Structure of Consciousness and SelfKnowledge

susan	brower-toland Medieval Approaches to Consciousness: Ockham and Chatton philosophers'	imprint – 26 – vol.	12,	no.	17	(november	2012) consciousness	is	a	higher-order	or	same-order	phenomenon	-	that	is, questions	about	whether	the	consciousness-bestowing	state	in	question	(whatever	its	exact	nature)	is	numerically	distinct	from	the	conscious	state	itself.	(Indeed,	as	we've	seen,	Chatton's	anti-intentionalist arguments target	both	higher-order and same-order versions	of the view.)	All	this	is	to	say	that,	while	Ockham's	view	represents	the	dominant type of approach,	his own	higher-order	perception account	of consciousness	is	but	one	among	the	many	ways	in	which	that	type	of view	gets	developed. The sort of approach Chatton defends is, by contrast, far less prominent.	For	the	same	reason,	while	there	may	be	different	ways of developing the details of a non-intentionalist approach, I'm unaware	of	any	extensive	discussion	or	development	of it among	medieval	philosophers.82	Chatton	himself,	as	we've	seen,	gives	far	more space to	criticizing	rival	positions than	to	articulating the	details	of his	own.	Nevertheless,	this	sort	of	approach	does	occupy	a	significant place in	medieval discussions of consciousness. Indeed, it receives attention	not	only	from	proponents	as	prominent	as	Chatton	and	(as I	read	him)	Thomas	Aquinas,	but	also	from	those	critical	of	this	sort of	approach.83 Interestingly, when it comes to criticism of this approach, two objections	in	particular	come	to	the	fore.	One	objection	is	just	that this non-intentional, primitively subjective mode of awareness is mysterious. Thus,	for	example,	Adam	Wodeham,	who	responds	explicitly	to	Chatton's	account,	simply	denies	the	postulation	of	a	nonintentional	or	non-objectual	mode	of	awareness.	As	he	says,	"I	never experience	an	act	as	an	act	unless	by	simultaneously	perceiving	that 82.	For example, among those working more in the phenomenological tradition	-	a	tradition	which	seems	to	share	much	in	common	with	this	second type	of	approach	-	one	finds	what	look	to	be	different	ways	of	developing	an account	of	subjectivity	in	non-intentional	terms.	See	Smith	1986,	Thomasson 2000,	and	Zahavi	1999. 83. I	defend	this	reading	of	Aquinas	in	Brower-Toland	forthcoming(b).	The	same sort	of	view	can	also,	I	believe,	be	attributed	to	Peter	Olivi.	See	Brower-Toland forthcoming(c). one's	states is	explicable in	terms	of	ordinary	intentionality	marks not only the fundamental divide between Ockham and Chatton but	also the	fundamental	divide	between	the	two	main	types	of	approach	on	offer	in	the	late	medieval	period	generally:	intentionalist and	non-intentionalist.	Thus,	there	are	those,	like	Ockham,	who	attempt	to	explain	consciousness	in	non-subjective	terms	and	those, like	Chatton,	who	regard	consciousness	as	a	primitively	subjective mode	of	awareness. The former, "Intentionalist",	approach	represents	what I take to be the majority view among medieval philosophers.79 As a taxonomic	category,	however,	it	comprises	a	fairly	heterogeneous	group of	theories.	Although	all	who	adopt	this	approach	share	in	common the	view	that	consciousness	reduces	to intentionality,	nonetheless, there	is	a	great	deal	of	disagreement	over	the	proper	analysis	of	the intentionality in question.80 Thus, like	Ockham, a number of	medieval	thinkers	adopt	a	representationalist	approach;	on	their	view, a	state	is	conscious	just	in	case	it	is	represented in	the	relevant	way. Even here, however, there is a range of positions regarding	what qualifies	as	the	relevant	mode	of	representation:	some	construe	it	as perceptual	in	nature,	others	as	something	more	thought-like.81	Then again, there	are those	who	explicitly reject the representationalist approach, insisting instead that the	subject	of intentional states is directly acquainted with her states without representing them in any	way	at	all. But	even	aside	from	questions	about	how	to	characterize	the	precise mode	of	intentionality,	there	are	further	questions	regarding	whether 79.	Although	scholarship	on the topic is	nascent (my	own included), it seems to	me	that	the	following	could	be	included	among	the	ranks	of	intentionalists:	Matthew	of	Aquasparta,	Roger	Marsden,	Vital	du	Four,	Durand	of	SaintPourçain,	Henry	of	Ghent,	John	Duns	Scotus,	and	Adam	Wodeham. 80.	I	offer	a	preliminary	survey	of	medieval	treatments	of	consciousness	and	selfknowledge	in	Brower-Toland	forthcoming(b). 81.	What	is	more,	as	there	are	a	host	of	views	about	the	nature	of	mental	representation	in	general,	there	are	a	host	of	views	about	the	nature	and	mechanisms	by	which	the	mind	or	intellect	can	represent	its	own	states. susan	brower-toland Medieval Approaches to Consciousness: Ockham and Chatton philosophers'	imprint – 27 – vol.	12,	no.	17	(november	2012) history	of	philosophy	but	also	continue	to	play	an	important	role in current	discussions	of	consciousness.86 87 References Armstrong, D. 1968.	A Materialist Theory of the Mind. London: Routledge	and	Kegan	Paul. Boler,	J.	1982.	"Intuitive	and	Abstractive	Cognition".	The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy,	ed.	N.	Kretzmann,	A.	Kenny,	and	J. Pinbourg.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press. Brower-Toland,	S.	2007.	"Intuition,	Externalism,	and	Direct	Reference in	Ockham".	History of Philosophy Quarterly 24: 317–336. ---.	Forthcoming(a). "How	Chatton	Changed	Ockham's	Mind:	William	Ockham	and	Walter	Chatton	on	Objects	of	Judgment".	Intentionality, Cognition, and Representation in the Middle Ages,	ed.	G.	Klima. Fordham:	Fordham	University	Press. ---. Forthcoming(b). "Self-Knowledge, Self-Consciousness, and	Reflexivity".	Companion to Cognitive Theory in the Later Middle Ages,	eds. R.	Friedmann	and	M.	Pickave.	Leuven:	Leuven	University	Press. ---.	Forthcoming(c). "Olivi	on	Consciousness	and	Self-Knowledge: The	Phenomenology,	Metaphysics,	and	Epistemology	of	Mind's	Reflexivity".	Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy	1	(2013). 86.	Contemporary	proponents	of	higher-order	perception	theories	of	consciousness, for example, while habitually citing Locke's "Inner Sense" theory as their	philosophical	ancestor,	actually	fall	within	a	tradition	that	extends	as	far back	as	Ockham	-	and,	indeed,	even	further.	Again,	while	the	type	of	theory Chatton	defends	receives	less	attention	in	current	analytic	treatments	of	consciousness,	it	nevertheless	represents	an	approach	that	figures	prominently in	the	phenomenological	tradition	and	which	has	much	in	common	with	current	phenomenological	approaches	to	consciousness. 87. I'm	very	grateful	to	Jeffrey	Brower	for	his	comments	on	earlier	drafts	of	this paper.	Portions	of	this	paper	were	presented	in	a	symposium	session	at	the 2009	Central	Division	Meeting	of	the	APA,	at	the	2011	Colloquium	in	Medieval	Philosophy	at	University	of	Toronto,	and	to	the	department	of	philosophy	at	Purdue	University. I'm	grateful to the	audiences	on three	occasions for	stimulating	discussion	and	helpful	feedback.	Particular	thanks	to	Richard Cross,	my	commentator	at	Toronto,	for	his	comments	on	the	paper. act.	And	this	is	to	experience	the	act	as an object."84 The	second	sort of	objection	draws	on	the	authority	of	Augustine.	As	Ockham's	discussion	makes	clear,	Augustine	is	often	understood	by	his	medieval successors as articulating a	higher-order, intentionalist account	of consciousness.	And	this	is	because	Augustine	himself	frequently	explains	self-knowledge	in	terms	of	the	mind	turning	its	"gaze"	upon itself	and	its	inner	states.	What	is	more,	it's	natural	to	suppose	that Augustine takes this inner awareness to	be structurally analogous to	world-directed awareness.	Accordingly, critics of the sort of approach	that	Chatton	and	Aquinas	advance	object to it	on	grounds that it runs "contrary to the opinion of Augustine"85 and insist instead	that	fidelity	to	Augustine	requires	taking	consciousness	as	(?) a	matter	of	the	mind's	taking	itself	and	its	states	as	objects	of	cognitive	awareness. In	these	ways,	therefore,	the	debate	between	Ockham	and	Chatton illuminates	not	only	the	two	main	types	of	approach	characteristic	of medieval	treatments	of	consciousness	in	general	but	also	the	dialectical	considerations	that	motivate	them.	Indeed,	I've	argued	that,	in	each case,	the	positions	advanced	not	only	hold	a	distinguished	place	in	the 84. Lectura Secunda in Librum Primum Sententiarum,	Prol.	q.2	(I,	60).	A	bit	earlier on in the	same	discussion,	Wodeham	raises the following	questions	about Chatton's	account:	"What	is	this	experience?	Either	it	is	the	soul	itself	when it	receives	its	act,	or	is	the	act,	or	a	relation	to	something,	since	there	are	not many	absolute	things	here.	It's	not	a	relation,	since	no	relation	is	a	vital	act, whatever	the	nature	of	each	experience	is.	It	isn't	an	act,	for	the	act	isn't	an	experience	unless	of	its	object.	Nor	is	it	the	soul,	since,	with	the	same	facility,	we could	posit	that	it	would	experience	every	present	object	whatsoever	when it is	present	-	in	which	case it	would	be	superfluous to	posit	ocular	vision when	visible	color is supposed	present." (Lectura Secunda in Librum Primum Sententiarum,	Prol.	q.2	[I,	59]) 85.	Matthew	of	Aquasparta	takes	up	just	such	a	line	of	argument	against	Aquinas. Along	these	lines,	he	quotes	Augustine	as	claiming	that	"the	gaze	of	the	mind" looks	upon	the	mind	in	just	the	way	that	the	"gaze	of	the	body	looks	on	the sun	or	mountains".	(Quaestiones Disputatae de Fide et de Cognitione,	Aqaracchi, 2nd	ed.,	1957,	q.5,	303).	Here	Matthew	cites	Augustine's	letter	"Ad	Paulinam" and	De Trinitate	XIII. susan	brower-toland Medieval Approaches to Consciousness: Ockham and Chatton philosophers'	imprint – 28 – vol.	12,	no.	17	(november	2012) Hellie, B. 2006. "Higher-Order Intentionality and Higher-Order Acquaintance".	Philosophical Studies	134:	289–324. Karger, E. 1999. "Ockham's Misunderstood Theory of Intuitive and Abstractive	Cognition".	The Cambridge Companion to Ockham, ed.	P. Spade.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press. King,	P.	Forthcoming(a).	"Thinking	About	Things". Intentionality, Cognition, and Representation in the Middle Ages,	ed.	G.	Klima.	Bronx,	NY: Fordham	University	Press. King, P. Forthcoming(b). "Medieval Intentionality and PseudoIntentionality ". Kriegel,	U.	2009.	Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory. Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press. ---.	2006. "The	Same-Order	Monitoring	Theory	of	Consciousness". In	Kriegel	and	Williford	2006. ---. 2004. "Consciousness and Self-Consciousness".	The Monist 87: 185–209 ---.	2003a.	"Consciousness	as	Intransitive	Self-Consciousness:	Two Views	and	an	Argument".	Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33:	103–132. ---.	2003b.	"Consciousness,	Higher-Order	Content,	and	the	Individuation	of	Vehicles".	Synthese	134:	477–504. Kriegel, U. and	Williford, K. 2006.	Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness.	Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Lycan, W. 1996. Consciousness and Experience. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. ---.	2001.	"A	simple	argument	for	a	higher-order	representation	theory	of	consciousness".	Analysis	61:	3–4. ---.	2004.	"The	superiority	of	HOP	to	HOT".	In	Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology, ed.	R.	Gennaro.	Amsterdam/Philadelphia:	John	Benjamins. Lynch,	J.	1972.	The Theory of Knowledge of Vital Du Four.	St.	Bonaventure, NY:	St.	Bonaventure	University	Press. Marenbon, J. 1987.	Later Medieval Philosophy (1150–1350): An Introduction.	London:	Routledge. Matthews,	G.	2005.	Augustine.	Oxford:	Blackwell. Byrne,	A. 1997. "Some like it	HOT: consciousness and higher-order thoughts".	Philosophical Studies	86:	103–129. Caston,	V.	2002.	"Aristotle	on	Consciousness".	Mind	111(444):	751–815. Chatton,	W.	1989.	Reportatio et Lectura super Sententias: Collatio ad Librum Primum et Prologus,	ed.	J.	Wey,	CSB.	[Studies and Texts	90]	Toronto: Pontifical	Institute	of	Mediaeval	Studies. Coventry,	A.	and	Kriegel,	U.	2008.	"Locke	on	Consciousness".	History of Philosophy Quarterly 25: 221–242. Carruthers, P. 2007. "Higher-Order Theories of	Consciousness".	The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2011 Edition), ed. E. Zalta, URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/ consciousness-higher/>. ---.	1996.	Language, Thought and Consciousness: An Essay in Philosophical Psychology.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press. Day,	S.	1947.	Intuitive Cognition: A Key to the Significance of the Later Scholastics.	St.	Bonaventure,	NY:	The	Franciscan	Institute. Dumont,	S.	1989.	"The	Scientific	Character	of	Theology	and	the	Origin of	Dun	Scotus'	Distinction	Between	Intuitive	and	Abstractive	Cognition".	Speculum	64:	579–599. Friedman,	R.	2009. "Peter	Auriol".	The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2009 Edition), ed. E.	Zalta,	URL	= <http://plato.stanford. edu/archives/fall2009/entries/auriol/>. ---.	Forthcoming.	"Act,	Species,	and	Appearance:	Peter	Auriol	on	Intellective	Cognition	and	Appearance".	Intentionality, Cognition, and Representation in the Middle Ages,	ed.	G.	Klima.	Bronx,	NY:	Fordham University	Press. Gallagher,	S.	and	Zahavi,	D.	2005.	"Phenomenological	Approaches	to Self-Consciousness".	The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2010 Edition),	ed.	E.	Zalta,	URL	=	<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/ win2010/entries/self-consciousness-phenomenological/>. Heinämaa,	S., Läteenmäki,	V., and	Remes,	P. (eds.). 2007.	Consciousness: From Perception to Reflection in the History of Philosophy. Dordrecht:	Springer. susan	brower-toland Medieval Approaches to Consciousness: Ockham and Chatton philosophers'	imprint – 29 – vol.	12,	no.	17	(november	2012) ---.	1998.	"The	First-Person	Perspective:	A	Test	for	Naturalism".	American Philosophical Quarterly	35:	327–48. Smith, D. 1986. "The Structure of (Self-)Consciousness". Topoi 5: 149–156. Stump, E. 1999. "Mechanisms of Cognition: Ockham on	Mediating Species".	The Cambridge Companion to Ockham, ed. P. Spade. Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press. Tachau, K. 1988. Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham: Optics, Epistemology and the Foundations of Semantics 1250–1345. Leiden: E. J. Brill. Thomasson, A. 2000. "After Brentano: A One-Level Theory of Consciousness". European Journal of Philosophy 8: 190–210. Toivanen, J.	2009.	Animal Consciousness: Peter Olivi on Cognitive Functions of the Sensitive Soul.	Doctoral	Dissertation. Jyväskylä:	University	of	Jyväskylä. Weisberg,	J.	2008.	"Same	Old,	Same	Old:	The	Same-Order	Representation	Theory	of	Consciousness	and the	Division	of	Phenomenological	Labor".	Synthese	160:	161–181. Wodeham,	A.	1990.	Lectura Secunda in Librum Primum Sententiarum,	ed. R.	Wood	and	G.	Gal.	St.	Bonaventure,	NY:	St.	Bonaventure	University	Press. Wolter,	A.	1990.	"Duns	Scotus	on	Intuition,	Memory,	and	Our	Knowledge	of Individuals".	The Philosophical Theology of John Duns Scotus, ed.	M.	Adams.	Ithaca,	NY:	Cornell	University	Press. Yrjönsuuri, M. 2007. "The Structure of Self-Consciousness: A Fourteenth-Century	Debate".	Consciousness: From Perception to Reflection in the History of Philosophy,	eds.	S.	Heinämaa,	V.	Lähteenmäki,	and	P. Remes.	Springer:	Dordrecht. Zahavi,	D.	2005.	Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective.	Cambridge,	MA:	MIT	Press. ---. 2004. "Back to Brentano?" Journal of Consciousness Studies 11: 66–87. ---.	1999.	Self-Awareness and Alterity: A Phenomenological Investigation. Evanston,	IL:	Northwestern	University	Press. ---.	1992.	Thought's Ego in Augustine and Descartes.	Ithaca,	NY:	Cornell University	Press. McGinn, C. 1991. "Consciousness and Content". The Problem of Consciousness: Essays Towards a Resolution. Oxford: Blackwell. Michon,	C.	2007. "Ego	Intelligo	(lapidem).	Deux	conceptions	de	la	réflexion	au	Moyen	Age".	Généalogies du sujet: De saint Anselme à Malebranche,	ed.	O.	Boulnois.	Vrin:	Paris. Neander,	K.,	1998.	"The	division	of	phenomenal	labor:	a	problem	for representational theories of consciousness". Language, Mind, and Ontology,	ed.	J.	Tomberlin.	Oxford:	Blackwell. Ockham,	W.	1967–88.	Opera Philosophica et Theologica.	St.	Bonaventure, NY:	St.	Bonaventure	University	Press. Pasnau,	R.	2003.	"Cognition".	The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus, ed.	T.	Williams.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press. Perler,	D.	2008.	"Seeing	and	Judging:	Ockham	and	Wodeham	on	Sensory	Cognition".	Theories of Perception in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy,	eds.	S.	Knuuttila	and	P.	Kärkkäinen.	Dordrecht:	Springer. Putallaz,	F.	2005.	"L'infinité	des	actes	réflexifs,	à	l'époque	de	Guillaume d'Ockham".	Selbstbewusstsein und Person im Mittelalter,	ed.	G.	Mensching.	Würzburg:	Königshausen	&	Neumann. ---.	1991.	La Connaissance de soi au XIIIe Siècle: De Matthieu D'aquasparta a Thierry De Freiberg. Vrin:	Paris. Rode,	C.	2010.	"Peter	of	John	Olivi	on	Representation	and	Self-Representation".	Quaestio: Yearbook of the History of Metaphysics	10:	155–166. ---.	2008. "Der	Begriff	der	inneren	Erfahrung	bei	Petrus	Johannis	Olivi".	Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch fur Antike und Mittelalter, Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter	13:	123–141. Rosenthal, D. 1986. "Two concepts of consciousness". Philosophical Studies	49:	329–359. ---.	2005.	Consciousness and Mind.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press. Rowlands,	M.	2001.	"Consciousness	and	higher-order	thoughts".	Mind and Language	16:	290–310. Rudder	Baker,	L. 2000.	Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press.